Introduction to Grace and Merit.

In this article, we will set out a brief introduction to Grace and Merit taken from the texts of the Schoolmen I have selected. It will be broken down into four sections. The first section is on Grace, the second on Merit, the third section will be a vindication of six Thomist propositions, and finally the fourth section will be solutions to three objections commonly brought forth.

The Fathers, Doctors, and theologians I have taken from include Sts. Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Robert Bellarmine, Frs. Jean-Baptiste Gonet, Francisco Suárez, the Salmanticenses, Charles-Rene Billuart, Paul Mezger, Phillip of the Blessed Trinity, Garrigou-Lagrange and Severino González Rivas. I have used each of their treatises on Grace and Merit respectively. I have adopted an easier mode of explanation for these rigorous authors, yet Scholastic theology requires concise and precise usage of words; therefore, I cannot but allow some exceptions.

Section I. On Grace, its essence and divisions.

In order to understand the matter, we must explicate what is meant by the term grace. This is where most controversies can be resolved. We are following Our Angelic Doctor and his faithful commentators on its meaning.

Its nominal definition etymologically signifies something given gratis. Meaning when someone is asked to do something gratuitously, not getting any benefit for themselves, but simply for the sake of the one for whom they do it. Or simply that without any prior claim, right, or merit on the part of the recipient, by reason of which it would be owed.

This is what the divine Paul presupposes in Romans 11:6: “but if it is by grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace”. The reasoning is clear: If it were given from works, it would not be given gratis, and therefore not grace.

So from this it belongs to the concept of grace to be given gratis. And hence we have arrived at a general meaning of grace, which is simply: a gift bestowed gratuitously.

The Doctor Eximius Francisco Suárez beautifully shows in his commentary that because there are many types of gifts, there are therefore many types of graces that will correspond to those gifts. The Apostle says “there are diversities of graces” (1 Corinthians 12:4). But all graces are reduced into two categories. See for this STh. I-II, q. 110, a. 1, the first two meanings of grace there.

a) Grace signifies love. This is because love is that first grace which can be conferred on one person to another, and it is that root whereby other gifts or benefits are given gratuitously. We call this uncreated grace.

b) Grace signifies gifts given purely gratuitously from love itself. See Romans 5:15; 12:6, etc. We call this created grace.

It is of importance to see the infinite difference between God's divine love and human love in this way:

Human love supposes an object in which it loves some goodness that makes it lovable, however divine love does not suppose the object good, it is that which makes it good and loves only out of benevolence. Or elegantly with St. Thomas (ST. I, q. 20, a. 2, resp.): The love of God infuses and creates goodness in things. So we get the commonly elicited axiom: No created being is in any respect better, unless it is preferred by God.

In this sense divine love is to be called grace in the second way above, because it is a gift from God purely out of gratuity. But in human love it is the opposite, it is not a grace except analogically, because when a human loves goodness or beauty in an object it is not a gift gratuitously given. This divine love is what we are concerned with here on the meaning of grace.

This is principally where one of the Pelagian errors arises. They did not concede that the love of God was the first cause of our good choices, they likewise couldn't distinguish the natural and supernatural meaning of grace, and so they often equivocated on the term grace, using it in a broad signification to designate any free gift of God. In this way Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange says even free will or creation are called “grace” according to them.

c) Grace signifies gratitude. This is because a gift calls for thanksgiving, so grace came to mean having gratitude for a gift or benefit received.

Now, all of these significations can also appear in human affairs, so we must transfer these meanings to the supernatural order. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange puts it excellently:

1. The love of benevolence on the part of God, conferring supernatural life. This love of God is uncreated grace. 2) The supernatural gift of grace itself, freely bestowed and ordained to eternal life; this is created grace… whether it is interior or exterior, such as the preaching of the gospel. 3) Our gratitude to God.

From this we gather grace is supremely divided into uncreated and created.

Uncreated is the kind of love whereby God has loved us from eternity in order to the supernatural end (first signification of grace). It can also be considered as “the special mode wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple.” (STh I, q. 43, a. 3, resp.)

And in ad. 3, “by the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.”

It is then distinguished into created, which comprehends those gifts, which are bestowed on us by God in order to the same end in time (second signification of grace).

Temporal and created grace is then divided into internal and external.

The former is that which resides in the soul of man or his powers, the latter is that which does not intrinsically affect him, but only extrinsically. The first genus pertains to sanctifying grace, infused moral virtues, gifts of the Holy Ghost, and assisting grace. The latter is reduced into external objects where our intellect becomes excited to know or love divine things (reading the Sacred Scriptures, Preaching the Word of God, Miracles of the Catholic faith, examples of Our Lord, Bl. Virgin, Saints, etc).

From this a subdivision of created-internal grace arises. It is distinguished into gratia gratum faciens which makes us pleasing and just, also known as sanctifying grace, and another which does not make us pleasing and just, commonly called gratia gratis data or charisms. The first is for the spiritual good (proper sanctification) of the one receiving that grace, the second is principally and directly for the good of others, although secondarily and indirectly it can help the recipient.

For sanctifying grace the Apostle speaks of in Romans 3: “Being justified freely by his grace”, however for charisms we see them listed in 1 Corinthians 12: “There are diversities of graces: to one indeed by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; and to another, the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another, faith in the same Spirit; to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues: to another, interpretation of speeches.”

Sanctifying grace is now divided once again into two types: habitual and actual.

Habitual grace inheres in the soul as a permanent quality, and on the other hand, actual grace is temporary to elicit an act which is salvific, we may also say it is the transient supernatural help of God which enlightens our mind and strengthens our will to do good and to avoid evil.

This is not an exhaustive division of grace, there are more divisions, however for this article all divisions listed above suffice.

Section II. On Merit, its essence and divisions.

Merit as to its name designates: a good work to which wages or reward is owed; a work conferring a right to a reward; or an acquisition of a right to a reward.

It is either within the concrete or abstract. The first three definitions are in the concrete, but in the abstract Cajetan in On Faith and Works says it is a right to a reward.

Merit now being defined, is either divided into merit de condigno which has its foundation in justice, or merit de congruo which is not based on justice.

Now it will be asked what does justice import?

To this, we say: justice is the virtue that renders to each his own right. Or also commonly defined as that virtue which rectifies the act of man in relation to another particular man, rendering to him what is his; by which man is directed in contracts of buying, selling, etc.

Justice is divided into general also known as legal or particular.

The first type of justice, regards the common good, rendering to it what is its own, and which St. Thomas says (ST. II-II, q. 58, a. 6, resp.) is in the Prince architectonically as in one commanding, and in subjects administratively as in those obeying and acting according to the law. This is in God formally in a much more eminent manner according to the titles King of kings and Lord of lords, etc. However this type of justice is not a part of the controversy so no more must be said.

The subjective parts of particular justice are divided into commutative and distributive.

The formal object of commutative justice is this: equality between what is given and what is received, so it can be formally and properly found only in one between whom and another there can be equality between what is given and what is received. [As a brief note, you can gather from the definition that God's essence does not have commutative justice, only distributive justice. The Angelic Doctor says In IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, Commutative justice, through which equality is established between God as giver and the creature as recipient, cannot belong to God according to its proper meaning. More on this below.]

Distributive justice on the other hand is not from equal to equal, as is commutative justice, but from a superior toward inferiors. For it belongs to a superior to distribute common goods to inferiors, to each according to his proportion. We can likewise consider it as a relation of the whole to its parts, so that the whole itself renders to each part what belongs to it.

That the difference between the two may be understood correctly: commutative justice establishes equality of quantity to quantity, meaning for example if someone owes one hundred, he renders one hundred based strictly from what is due; distributive justice observes only an equality of proportion to proportion, for it does not give equally to all, but to each according to his condition or merit. Think of the father of a household who gives clothing to the whole family, but not the same clothing, rather smaller ones to children and larger ones to adults, and thus he distributes prudently.

Right is divided into objective and subjective. (we are only concerned with objective right here).

Objective right is that which is due to another. That which is due to another makes for him a certain adjustment in conformity with law. With H. Grenier (Thomistic Philosophy, pp. 553-555) it can also be said to be that which is adjusted and due to another.

The material aspect of objective right is a just thing, its formal aspect the relation of equality.

Objective right is divided into natural right and positive right.

Natural right is: what everywhere has the same force; and that which is necessary by its own nature everywhere, and not because it seems or does not seem to be, and not because it is established by someone's will or judgment (Aristotle, Ethics V, c. 7). Or simply: that which of its very nature is due to another.

Positive right is that which is such not by its own nature but depends on some institution. Otherwise defined as: that which is due to another in virtue of the authority of the people or ruler, i.e., in virtue of positive law.

Now with all of this in mind,

a) Merit de condigno within strict justice implies an absolute equality to the reward.

b) Merit purely condign, which theologically in the case of supernatural merit, has a value not equal to the reward, but proportionate to it according to an antecedent divine ordination, promise, and covenant. Thomists against Scotists and Nominalists affirm that this proportion comes from the intrinsic dignity of sanctifying grace which merit has as its root. This root has a certain proportion to beatitude. And likewise Its dignity is not on an extrinsic ordination or acceptance. However on the end of God, His obligation to render the reward is from His antecedent promise and covenant.

c) Merit de congruo strictly speaking is based on friendship thereby getting a friendly right to such reward, theologically you must be in a state of grace for this type since grace makes one a friend of God (see John 15:15). Broadly it is based on God's mercy, which theologically does not presuppose an actual state of grace, but a disposition to grace.

Strict de condigno merit has only happened within the person of Christ because of His dignity being equal to God the Father which rendered His acts of absolute equality. Merit de congruo is found in works where it has as its root charity. So a Christian may merit de congruo the first grace of another. As the case for St. Monica and her beloved son St. Augustine, or what the Bl. Virgin "merits for us de congruo... what Jesus Christ merits for us de condigno". On this last sentence and its meaning, see Our Holy Lord Pope St. Piux X, Ad Diem Illum Laetissimum; Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, The Mother Of The Saviour, c. 2, a. 2, "Mary's Merits For Us".

Keep in mind however that merit (acquisition of a right to a reward) can be taken within a double sense which carefully has to be distinguished.

Either acquisition of a right imports an obligation of justice on the part of the one who renders that reward. In this sense it is denied regarding supernatural merit. Secondly acquisition of a right imports an obligation of justice improperly so called and according to a certain manner. This is what we affirm.

Now there are six conditions for merit. These conditions are important to consider, the theologians give different conditions but here we are following the school of St. Thomas.

Conditions Required on the Part of the Meritorious Act:

1. It must be free.
2. It must be morally good.
3. It must be done in the service of another.

Conditions Necessary on the Part of the Person Meriting:

4. Being in the state of grace.
5. It must be done in the state of this life (known also as wayfarer).

Condition Required for Merit on the Part of God:

6. The ordination of the work to a reward.

With all the necessary definitions and divisions,

Section III: Vindication of Six Thomist Propositions.

Proposition I: Man without grace cannot merit anything supernatural.

This is quite easily proven in this syllogism:

Beatitude is essentially and entitatively supernatural which exceeds all of created or creatable nature and its proportion as with all of its operations. But merit is that which confers a right to a proportionate reward from God's preordination. Therefore, etc.

Likewise, no unjust person can merit eternal life, unless he is reconciled with God by a remission of those sins, but no sin is forgiven except by grace. Therefore, etc.

Propositions II-IV: A man who does a) good works that proceed from grace truly merits a reward before God, b) even condignly c) from the pact of God.

The first part and second part is against the pseudo-reformers, especially the early ones, in which the Sacred Council of Trent in Session 6, Can. 16 says: "If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man are so the gifts of God, that they are not also good merits of the justified man himself, etc., let him be anathema."

Proof of the first part. From Holy Scripture. Hebrews 13: "Do not forget beneficence and communication, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased."; see where it is compared to the crown received as their own by those who run in a race: “Do you not know that in a race all the runners run, but only one receives the prize? Run in such a way as to obtain it. Every athlete exercises self control in all things; they do it to receive a perishable crown, but we an imperishable one” (1 Corinthians 9:24–25), where it is called the recompense of an inheritance: Knowing that from the Lord you will receive the recompense of the inheritance; serve the Lord Christ (Colossians 3:24), Ecclesiasticus 16: "Every mercy will make room for each one according to the merit of his works.", the notion of merit itself is found explicitly in Jeremiah 36: "there is a reward for your work”, 2 Timothy 4: "There is laid up for me a crown of justice, etc." See also 1 Peter 5, Wisdom 9, James 1, and Matthew 5.

Proof of the second part. From St. Paul in 2 Thessalonians 1 when telling them to have charity, faith and patience, in the sufferings they endure, adds: “that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which you also suffer; if indeed it is just with God to repay affliction to those who afflict you, and to you who are afflicted, rest with us in the kingdom of God.”

It is to be observed here that just as Paul calls it just before God to repay punishment for sins, so also to reward merits — and that for the same reason: just as sins condignly merit the punishment with which they are punished by God, so the merits of the just merit the beatitude with which they are rewarded by God himself.

The Salmanticenses argue using St. Thomas’ reasoning proves the proposition in these following arguments.

1. An act proceeding from grace is entirely proportionate in the character of merit and of equal value — at least virtually — with eternal life; therefore, given God's promise, it will be condignly meritorious of it. The consequence is clear, because given God's promise — which we presuppose to be present — nothing else can be desired for condign merit except the said equality or proportion. The antecedent is proved: first, because by the very fact that an act proceeds from grace, it receives the value and dignity of grace itself, and indeed also the efficacy of leading to what grace is capable of.

2. Because an act proceeding from grace is by that very fact informed and vivified and animated by the grace from which it proceeds; but an act informed by some form thereby has the value and dignity of that form. If, therefore, grace has a value equal or sufficiently proportioned to eternal life, this value will also belong to the act that proceeds from grace.

3. Because through grace the Holy Spirit himself dwells in the soul — he who is the pre-eminent cause of beatitude — and therefore from his power and movement our acts can receive a dignity and value sufficiently proportioned to beatitude itself; therefore, etc.

Proof of the third part. From St. Thomas (ST. I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad. 3) “For God does not simply become our debtor, but his own, inasmuch as it is owed that his ordering be fulfilled.", so without any act of God, He cannot be obligated to man.

Confirmation. Merit, just as on the part of the one meriting it imports some active right, so on the part of God rewarding correlatively it imports a debt and passive obligation toward rendering the wage: therefore merit requires some promissory and ordinative act of God of the work toward the reward. The major is clear from the infinite and unabdicable independence of Divine dominion, by reason of which he himself is bound to no one, but we along with our works are bound to him by a thousand titles.

Proposition V. God renders one reward for their merits out of justice, and not of gratitude or fidelity.

Proof from Sacred Scripture. “There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day” (2 Timothy 4).

I therefore argue. What is bestowed as reward and crown by God as the just judge is given from justice not from gratitude or fidelity. See St. Thomas here in lecture 2: “A crown of justice is called, which God renders from his own justice. For consider the following words: Which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall render unto me in that day.”

Likewise Our Holy Doctor St. Augustine Tract 3 on John: “That he might in the former instance receive grace, he stood in need of a merciful Father; for the reward of grace, of a just judge.”

This is also confirmed by the Apostle in this way. “God is not unjust, that he should forget your work” (Hebrews 6). But it is openly contradictory if God rendered rewards purely from fidelity alone, because the Apostle would not say God is not unjust that he should forget your work, but would rather say He is not unfaithful that he should forget his word or promise. So not from any other reason except justice God rewards the just. Therefore the beautiful passage from Our Doctor Augustine: “God is not unjust, that he should defraud the just of the wages of justice.” (Nature and Grace, c. 2)

Proposition VI: The retribution of a reward in God is not from commutative justice, but of distributive justice.

Proof of the first part with Ludovico Gotti. Commutative justice is not found formally in God: Therefore the retribution of wages for the merits of men is not in God an act of commutative justice. For commutative justice properly so called necessarily requires that a legal debt arise in the extremes in which it is found, from the giving of one and the receiving of the other: But no creature can give anything to God through merits, according to that of the Apostle: “Who has first given to him and it shall be recompensed to him?” (Romans 11:35). Therefore there cannot be properly said commutative justice in God.

Confirmation. Commutative justice is founded on a strict debt, or obligation of conferring something to another: But in God there cannot be a strict debt or obligation with respect to the creature; since a strict debt imports some inferiority and dependence of the debtor on him to whom it is owed. Therefore, etc.

Proof for the second part becomes evident through reduction. Only three species of true and strict justice are given, legal, commutative, and distributive. However if such retribution to a reward is not an act of legal or commutative justice, it must necessarily proceed from distributive justice.

Confirmation. Distributive justice says the greatest perfection and excellence, and does not have attached the defects which are inseparable from commutative justice: therefore it is found formally in God, and consequently from it the retribution of reward proceeds. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved. In the first place indeed distributive justice is not equal to equal, as commutative, but of a superior to inferiors, for it pertains to the superior to distribute to inferiors from common goods, to each according to his proportion: hence such justice is most fitting for the supreme ruler and governor of the world.

Section IV: Solutions to Objections.

Obj. 1: Catholics affirm that one can merit eternal life de condigno, but to merit de condigno is against the gratuity of grace. Therefore etc.

Resp. Against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, all Catholics affirm without hesitation that grace as to all kinds supernatural is totally gratuitous. Meaning nothing in man obliges God to grant him it, nor is there any right in human nature to have grace. Hence, grace is not due to created nature. Whenever God wills one to have grace and beatitude, this is only from His infinite mercy and likewise there is no consideration of merit whereby God chooses to predestine or not predestine.

This is explicitly taught dogmatically in the Sacred Council of Trent in Session 6, Chapter 5: “The beginning of the said Justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they are called”, see also Canon 1 “If any one saith, that man may be justified before God by his own works, whether done through the teaching of human nature, or that of the law, without the grace of God through Jesus Christ; let him be anathema.”; Orange Canon 18: “That grace is not preceded by merit.”, and an infinite amount of other places.

Further, as to when we do merit something from God, it proceeds from grace and charity which possess an equality of proportion with the beatific vision. This is important to distinguish, because a meritorious work can be considered from man in two ways: insofar as it proceeds from free choice, and in another insofar as it is from sanctifying grace. According to the actual entity insofar as it comes from free will cannot condignly merit eternal life. But insofar as it proceeds from sanctifying grace then it merits eternal life condignly.

This last part is proved from Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet in this fashion. grace is that whereby one is begotten, born, and reborn from God and adopted as his children. But since generation is the communication of nature, birth is the reception of nature, and only one who expresses and participates in the nature of his father is to be called a son, without doubt the just must be believed to enjoy through grace a participation in the divine nature.

Therefore grace as grace has a certain proportion to eternal life as “the seed of God remains in him.” (1 John 3). But a seed, although less perfect than the fruit according to entity, is nevertheless equal to it according to power and proportion, because not only the fruit but the whole tree is virtually contained in the seed.

St. Robert Bellarmine likewise infers the proposition in this way: eternal life is a certain supernatural action on the part of the object and principle, both efficient and also formal; but merit, which consists in love, is also a supernatural action on the part of the object and principle, both efficient and formal; therefore they have proportion between themselves, and one leads to the other as if by a direct path to its end.

As to the second premise. There is no argument, there is a disparity between natural merits done by the powers of nature alone and supernatural merits which in themselves are bestowed from God's gratuitous love, with the preservation and augmentation of sanctifying grace. See St. Paul, yet not I, but the grace of God with me (1 Cor 15:10).

Obj. 2: Merits are said to be equal to eternal life, but nothing can be equal to eternal life since it exceeds all natural exigency, capacity, and power. Therefore etc.

Resp. I distinguish the second premise. If it is considered according to the substance of the work and insofar as it proceeds from free will, then condignity cannot be found there because of the great inequality. But if we speak of the meritorious work insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost, then it is meritorious of eternal life by condign merit. Likewise the elect are ordained through the communicated participation in the divine nature, hence it follows that a man who has become a partaker of sanctifying grace is constituted, by reason of his very being, intrinsically worthy of eternal life. But a work of grace cannot be of a lower order than the grace from which it proceeds. Therefore, a work of grace will be one by which a man becomes worthy of eternal life also by reason of his activity. But the condignity which belongs to one by reason of his activity is precisely the condignity of merit, adding to the condignity that belongs by reason of the condition of being. Read once more the authors cited above on grace having a proportion to beatitude.

Obj. 3, with Calvin in Antidote on session 6, chapter 16: Eternal life in Scripture is called an inheritance. But an inheritance is owed to sons, not from merit and labor, but from the sole right of sonship or adoption. Therefore, etc.

Resp. Firstly, we are not called sons of God by nature, but by adoption. Only infants who die after baptism receive heaven solely as an inheritance. Secondly, adults who receive heaven receive under a twofold title: inheritance by virtue of that adoption and as a reward by obeying God's commandments.

St. Paul, terror of Calvinists, indicates this quite explicitly in Colossians 3:23–24: “Whatever you do, work from the soul, as for the Lord and not for men, knowing that from the Lord you will receive the recompense of inheritance.”

Here it is clear he shows the conferral of eternal life not merely under the title of inheritance, but also a reward or recompense.

Fr. Martinus Becanus gives the excellent reason:

First, because, since they are not sons by nature but by adoption, God was able to adopt them under this condition: that they should not enter upon the inheritance unless they were willing to obey the commandments of God and, by obeying, merit the inheritance. Second, because something similar happened to Christ. For by right of inheritance—supposing the hypostatic union—the glory of the body and exaltation of the name were owed to Him. And yet He obtained them by His merits, according to that saying of the Apostle in Philippians 2:8–9: “He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross; for which reason God also exalted Him,” and so forth. Therefore, if to Christ, who was the natural Son of God, the glory of the body was given under the double title of inheritance and reward, what wonder is it if to us, who are sons only by adoption, eternal life is conferred under each title?

GLORIA IN EXCELSIS DEO