On Criterion, Evidence, Motives of Credibility, and Faith.

The truthfulness and infallibility of the Church are known to us from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which it is accepted and believed that these things are revealed in Scripture or Tradition.

-Fr. Charles-René Billuart, O.P., Summa Summae S. Thomae, t. III, dist. I, art. II.

Before entering into the article itself, in a few words, I will provide a summary of the article and its main end.

This article is divided into two sections.

The first section is philosophical. Here I explain the essence of a sign, the essence of the criterion, the essence of evidence, and then certitude, along with all of their proper divisions, and then I explain the division of objective certitude into metaphysical, physical, and moral, along with pointing out the difference between that which is certain and that which is evident.

The second section is theological. Here I start with the motives of credibility as explicated by the theologians and taught by the Vatican Council I, along with their proper divisions, which are external and internal, extrinsic and intrinsic. I then go into the reasons, against the Protestants, Modernists, and the semi-rationalists, why the external-extrinsic motives alone (miracles and prophecy) are the primary criteria for divine revelation. From here I treat miracles, their definition according to the Angelic Doctor, their strictly supernatural character, and the probative force of the motive drawn from an indirect argument ex signo. From here I go into their divisions according to substance, subject, and mode; their properties; and the notion of potency, which they presuppose. The same method of treatment is then given to prophecy: its definition, its threefold sense, its divisions by reason of the object and by reason of the mode of knowledge, and its probative value.

From here we pass to the act of faith itself, the general notion of faith as resting on testimony and the authority of a witness, the properly theological notion of faith as defined by Vatican I, the formal and material objects of supernatural faith, the reason the act of faith is essentially obscure, the twelve acts of intellect and will which come before the act of faith is elicited, and finally, the difference between credibility and credentity. I then close with answering whether the grace of faith is required to attain certitude of a miracle.

The intention of this article, however, is not to apologetically prove the credibility and divine origin of the Catholic faith, which perhaps is for another article, God willing. This article is rather going to be an introduction to the Catholic philosophico-theological notions which must first be known before the credibility of the faith can be asserted and proved concretely through the external-extrinsic motives.

For a general theological bibliography¹ concerning this matter, I cannot but recommend to everyone Father Garrigou-Lagrange's well-known work On Divine Revelation. Translated in two volumes very nicely by Matthew K. Minerd. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, a true disciple of the Angelic Doctor, perfectly explicates all that is required for apologetics in two volumes. Far superior to any apologetic work produced since then, and perhaps even before. I also highly recommend Father Charles-René Billuart's Summa Summae S. Thomae, Tomus III, dist. II-III. This is the greatest Thomist introductory manual.

To understand the motives of credibility, we must understand the idea of a criterion, evidence, and how it relates to demonstrating the true religion, so we first inquire philosophically from naturally known principles with sound philosophy. Then secondly, we inquire into the theological part using faith as our guide for reason.

PHILOSOPHICAL PART.

ON THE SUPPOSITION that GOD makes revelation to man, He marks that revelation with characteristics that make us certain that this revelation is truly divine (i.e., from God Himself) and not from any other source, be it the invention of man, demons, etc.

These characteristics are called signs because they manifest that revelation as being truly divine. A sign is a thing which, besides the species that it brings into the senses, causes something else to come into cognition from itself².

According to the true philosophy³, we can put the above definition of a sign as whatever represents to a cognitive power something diverse from itself. There are two things which belong to the nature of a sign:

I) It is representative, which manifests something, and II) it expresses an order to another. Therefore, it is to something distinct from itself. Hence, for instance, whenever you see smoke in a forest, that is a sign of a fire; the footprints of a lion: a lion was in your path; laughter, internal joy, etc.

A sign is considered natural when its very nature represents it and is the same for all. Consequently, smoke is a natural sign of fire. On this point of natural signs, a miracle, since it is a sign of revelation, as it often is, is not a mere sign in general but a natural sign and especially apt because of the connection with it, for, although a connection of this kind is not a connection of cause and effect, it is a final connection because the theology of a miracle is directed necessarily to the moral order⁴.

THE NOTION OF CRITERION. "Criterion," by its etymology (κρίνω, "I judge"), is the means of judging. In this broad sense, the term can mean either the faculty that infallibly discerns some truth or that by which the intellect is directly guided in judging, or, if you like, a means which manifests truth.

The last two definitions are what we are concerned with; hence, the mind can be guided in two ways: by an efficient cause that brings the intellect to an unwavering assent or by a norm through which the true is distinguished from the false.

Therefore, we gather from this that the criterion admits a twofold definition: A. Taken in the first sense, it is defined as the motive of producing firm assent—this is the cause and measure of our cognition. B. Taken in the second sense, it is defined as the norm by which we tell true from false and determine whether a given proposition is true or false.

Certainty does not extend to all things, but only those bearing definite marks or notes. With this, therefore, there must be some rule fixing the matters about which we can or must be certain. It is this rule, or norm, that is called the criterion. Or, simply, the criterion is the mark of truth, the norm, and the indication by which we discern truth from falsity.

THE TWOFOLD PART OF THE CRITERION. It must be immutable, as truth itself is, and likewise infallible. The criterion we speak of cannot be indifferent to that which is true or false. It must be that proper mark or note of the true.

OBJECTIVE CRITERION ALSO CALLED EVIDENCE. We define objective criterion or evidence as the perspicuity of truth to which the mind cannot deny assent. The truth of the thing and the capacity of the intellect are so proportioned and commensurate that the intellect's gaze is necessarily fixed upon the truth and necessarily adheres to it.

Evidence admits a relation to the intellect as the light and colors of bodies do so to the eye. St. Thomas⁵ teaches: “For that is called light in spiritual things which stands in relation to intellectual manifestation as corporeal light stands in relation to sensitive manifestation.” Commenting on this, Fr. Hugon says⁶, just as the brilliance of a corporeal object necessitates the eye to see, so the brilliance of truth captures the assent of the intellect. And this brilliance of truth is properly and formally evidence.

Fr. Hugon explains what the brilliance of the object is in this manner: “That which illumines—that is, which intrinsically manifests an object—is the form or essence of the thing; for everything is known through its form… the essence of a thing receives a certain brilliance and intelligibility by which the whole thing is illuminated.” “Therefore, the brilliance of an object,” he says, “is that which the object has in the intelligible species, insofar as this species is illumined by the agent intellect and illumines the first principles.”

ON OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE EVIDENCE. Objective evidence is that brilliance by which the object is illumined and irradiated or the transcendental truth of being, which actually causes a true judgment; subjective evidence is perspicuity insofar as it comes from the object to the perception of the intellect, that is, it is the clear intuition of the object shining upon the mind, which removes all fear of erring. A clear note of objective certitude is that it precedes and causes subjective evidence. In addition to this, properly speaking, only objective evidence is evidence.

INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Intrinsic evidence is the evidence of an object in itself, which is nothing apart from the agreement of essential predicates being seen, in which case the intellect is necessitated by the object itself. Extrinsic evidence is that by which the object does not become evident in itself but only in external motives, in which case the intellect is not determined by the object but needs the motion of the will to be inclined to assent.

For example, in this proposition: “God is three and one.” My intellect cannot possibly see how the unity and pure simplicity of the divine essence and the three infinite and most divine persons are compatible with each other, and so, therefore, the object does not compel the intellect. However, I am certain that God is truthful and that God has revealed that thing to be knowable, and He cannot deceive; there is, therefore, a motive for adhering to this object, and the will can safely and prudently compel the intellect to assent to that object.

Fr. Hugon⁷ tells us regarding the reasons to which one assents: “In the case of intrinsic evidence, the mind assents on account of the authority of evidence; but in the case of extrinsic evidence, it assents on account of the evidence of authority, or the evidence of probability. Every assent, moreover, to be prudent, requires some evidence… at least extrinsic. Even the truths of [the divine] faith, though not intrinsically evident, nonetheless enjoy true extrinsic evidence, for it is clearly established that there are motives for believing firmly without any fear of erring.” ⁸

CERTITUDE. Certitude is commonly defined as the firm adherence of the mind to some knowable object, by reason of motives that exclude all fear of erring. (S. Th, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1. ad 7.)

Three conditions are necessary for certitude. I) The object must be so necessary that it cannot be otherwise—otherwise the assent resting on it would waver; II) The intellect must know this necessity of the object. Now, if the intellect clearly sees that the thing cannot be otherwise, it thereby perceives that a failure of truth cannot occur. But if it is impossible for a failure of truth to occur, the mind must adhere to truth without any fear of error and rest in it: III) The complete exclusion of fear. Because certitude denotes a real infallibility, immobility, and firmness, it is a property of cognition under the second act of intellectual judgement (known also as enunciation, where affirmation or negation is elicited), not simple apprehension or the first act of the intellect, which does not affirm or deny. This is because it has no adherence whatsoever.

Now this firmness of adherence cannot be taken in any way but as one which is prudent, which therefore arises from the merits of the enunciable itself, namely from firm motives duly weighed. Fr. Urráburu explains⁹: “Certitude is generally apprehended by all as a most excellent perfection of cognition; but a firm assent posited either beyond the force of objective motives, or without consideration and rashly is certainly not prudent, nor does it contain perfection, but a vice to be especially avoided in the sciences. Therefore, if that firmness of adherence is truly and simply to be called certitude.” Or simply formulated: one who is firm prudently in their certitude is one whose mind is guided by a solid motive; otherwise it will be rash, i.e., a blind judgment with no solid foundation.

DIVISIONS. Because certitude is that which is from cognition. We must note that cognition has the knowing power, the cognition itself, and the object to which this cognition is terminated. And therefore a threefold certitude is distinguished: adhesive, formal, and objective.

ADHESIVE. This is proper to itself, and it is the firm adherence of the mind to the object that is judged true. This is the determination of the intellect to one side. And it being purely adhesive in the intellect, the certitude is not correlative to the object being true or infallible. The three streams of this type of certitude: I) Prudence (one may, with a prudent intellect, weigh the evidence and find no reason to doubt), II) Rashness, which is from the fact that, “lightly and without reflection, with motives not sufficiently weighed, a judgment is pronounced”; and III) Willpower (from the command of the will, whether prudent or not). The analogy given by Fr. Urráburu¹⁰ is a person walking through a field who fears no ambush can happen either because, after the place has been carefully surveyed, none are found; or because, from levity and precipitation of mind, not enough attention is paid to dangers that may lie hidden; or finally because the will does not allow any movements of fear to be aroused, or restrains them once they have arisen.

FORMAL. This belongs to the act of cognition itself. It is the necessary and intrinsic connection of the act with the object, or the infallibility of a cognition under which the false cannot lie; or, if you prefer, otherwise defined, the intrinsic repugnance of cognition to falsity. Where this intrinsic connection with truth can come to a certain act is from two sources: I) Efficient principle. Take, as an example, supernatural acts of cognition, elicited by the help of grace, have absolute infallibility. II) Formal or motive principle. By the very formal principle, these acts are intrinsically connected with truth, which is posited from such a motive or foundation as necessarily entails the truth of the enunciable. Thus, it is impossible that a cognition resting on divine authority, or on an evident motive, be false.

OBJECTIVE. This is nothing other than the very necessity of the object. This belongs to the object being known. If the act of cognition is formally certain, the object it correlates to must be necessary in some way.

The object can be necessary in three ways,

METAPHYSICALLY. Certitude is metaphysical when the firmness of assent is founded in the very essence of the thing, such that it is intrinsically contradictory for the thing to be otherwise. Or simply, that which is derived from the essential relations of things, and therefore is insuperable by any power, even divine power (the whole is greater than its part; man is rational). Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange¹¹ explains it in this manner: metaphysical necessity is had when the connection between the predicate and subject of a statement is absolutely necessary — that is, when it depends on the nature of its subject and predicate being made manifest through an analysis of those notions. Therefore, the denial of a metaphysically certain assertion implies a contradiction in an absolute manner. In this certitude, there is an absolutely necessary resolution to intelligible being, the formal object of the intellect, and to the first principles of reason.

PHYSICALLY. It is physical when the firmness of assent rests on the constancy of the laws of nature or, if you will, is that which arises from the natural laws and powers of things determined to act in a certain definite way; it is insuperable by every created power and can be overcome only by a miracle of divine omnipotence. For instance, this proposition: fire burns, heat expands iron, and heavy things fall to the center unless they are supported. It is to be noted that the determination belongs to the act only within the order proportioned to its own intrinsic physical constancy. Thus, in every case where there are no extrinsic determinations, heavy things fall towards the ground unless supported by something outside that order of a heavy thing (a table on which that heavy thing rests). So this necessity is only hypothetical insofar as it is necessarily produced on the hypothesis that there are no impediments. Thus, Holy Fr. Suárez teaches in Disp. Metaph., Disp. XIX, Sect. X, n. 3.

So it does not matter if one objects: Jesus Christ rose from the dead; a priori, rising from the dead goes against the physical necessity of the constant laws of nature; therefore, it is impossible. One can easily see the sophism hidden in this argument. Not only a hidden supposition of naturalism and a denial of the supernatural order, but likewise a hidden assertion of physical necessity being absolute and not hypothetical.

MORALLY. This is from the necessity that seems harder to grasp. Many skeptics attempt to destroy its certitude completely. We define moral necessity as an impossibility of the opposite, which, although it could even be overcome by created power and without a miracle, nevertheless is not ordinarily overcome. Simply put, moral necessity is when we cannot de facto overcome a great difficulty in the ordinary conditions of our life without having that morally necessary thing.

So it would be morally impossible that a man who has no clue of music should so skillfully place his hands on an instrument and play an entire symphony of Rossini, or that a man should arrive, by natural reason alone, at a perfect knowledge of natural religion; it is morally impossible for unaided reason to do so. From this fact, where there is such knowledge, it is morally certain that it comes from revelation. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange says¹², “Likewise, it is morally impossible that a given intelligent and honest witness would lie in these particular circumstances. This certitude is had through the mediation of suitable human testimony. Yes, indeed, it is metaphysically and physically possible that a witness can be deceived and can deceive. Nonetheless, all things considered, his testimony seems evidently credible, and it produces true moral certitude and not merely great probability.”

The reason these certitudes are diverse is that the formal motive is specifically diverse. In metaphysical certitude the motive is the connection between subject and predicate founded on the necessary and immutability of essences; physical certitude, the connection between subject and predicate founded on the hypothetical necessity of the laws of nature; moral certitude, the connection between subject and predicate founded on the hypothetical constancy of the laws governing human conduct.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND EVIDENCE. We have said that evidence is the perspicuity of the object, which infallibly determines the mind and causes it to adhere without any fear of erring; certainty, on the other hand, is that firm and infallible assent itself. Certainty, most properly speaking, is a property of the act of the intellect; evidence rather belongs to the side of the object.

THEOLOGICAL PART.

Now that we have the philosophical preliminaries in mind, we will discuss the motives of credibility, what the Vatican I Council teaches of them, and their divisions. We will then move to miracles and prophecies with the same method, along with a demonstration of their probative value as real signs that demonstrate credibility. The discussion will then be brought to a close on faith.

MOTIVES OF CREDIBILITY. The Holy Vatican I Council teaches that the revelation given to man by God can be confirmed and proven with utter certainty by external arguments; she declares this happens by “divine facts, and especially by miracles and prophecies which… are the most certain signs of revelation and are adapted to the intelligence of all”¹³, and also, “If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by outward signs and that, therefore, men ought to be moved to faith solely by one’s inner experience or by personal inspiration, let him be anathema”¹⁴.

The Council here is saying that the motives of credibility are the notes by which revealed religion is made evidently credible to divine faith. These signs spoken of are the criteria of revelation. This is the criterion by which we distinguish the true revelation from the false: a true divine legate sent by God, and a false one. These signs are those which render revelation credible from a moral and prudent certitude. When someone asks a Catholic, “Why is your religion more credible than any other?” the Catholic must respond with these.

Because it was said above that criteria have their proper divisions, it likewise follows that the criteria of revelation are divided into many types based on the nature of the motives, just as objective certitude is divided by its motive of necessity.

So,

THE DIVISIONS OF MOTIVES OF CREDIBILITY¹⁵. If it is from facts which are consequent to or follow upon revelation, the criterion is external; if it is external to religion, then it is external-extrinsic (miracles and prophecy); if it is intrinsic to the religion, then it is external-intrinsic (sublimity of doctrine, loftiness, miraculous and wonderful life of the Church, etc.). Whenever we examine the actual revealed religion internally, the criterion is internal because it rests in the consciousness; this is further divided into universal (fulfilling the aspirations of humanity, etc.) and individual (joy and peace the world cannot give, etc.).

I WILL ONLY discuss the external-extrinsic motives of credibility. For two reasons, one negative, the other positive.

A. Against the Protestants and semi-rationalists like Schleiermacher, Catholic theologians do not place the primary criteria of revelation in the internal criteria, whether it is the internal inspiration of the Holy Ghost (Calvin) or religious experience/feeling (Schleiermacher). This is because neither position is in any certain way accommodated to all of discerning revelation; the reasons being because I) they are subject to many illusion; II) only men with great spiritual gifts can truly discern their certitude and thus not all; III) it would make truth contradict truth (Montanists, Reformers, Modernists, Mormons, etc. all oppose one another, yet they claim to have such certitude of their revelation).

The Church is also against those who use the method of immanence, which severely exaggerates the value of these internal motives to the point where it replaces the external criteria. Catholics who do affirm the supernatural origin of Catholicism, like Blondel and Laberthonnière, say that because the Catholic faith satisfies an innate and internal desire of religion, there is a practical necessity of embracing the faith. This is reductively against the faith because it destroys the demonstrative value and force of miracles, which is affirmed dogmatically. It likewise fails to show the credibility of the Christian religion and, as Calvin and the semi-rationalists do, makes Christianity a type of religious experience which is superior to others. This is tainted by the teachings of Hegel and Kant.

Likewise, note that the individual motives only give a probability to the credibility, not a certainty, which is what the Church requires; see Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, Divine Revelation, c. 17, a. 1, §2.

B). The Holy Catholic Church has always placed the primary criteria of revelation in the external motives of credibility, both intrinsic and extrinsic. This is because I) these miracles do not require a skilled and developed intellect in the sciences; II) these motives are not subject to illusions as the subjective criteria of certainty are, thus an easier recourse to these criteria is obvious because they are transmitted through an objective testimony which gives us certainty and therefore; III) they are adapted to the intelligence of all. And so, taken together, they constitute not only an irresistible argument for the learned, but because they are certain, external, and objective, they are per se sufficient for the simple as well. So Vatican I¹⁶, “God willed… that exterior proofs of his revelation… Especially miracles and prophecies are the most certain signs of the divine revelation adapted to the intelligence of all men”.

However, I will not discuss the external-intrinsic motives. Miracles of this sort are indeed utterly certain, drawn from the religion's excellence, sanctity, and purity, such as the miraculous life of the Church from Her inexhaustible spiritual fecundity and especially in the perseverance of the martyrs, which can only be produced by God. Now one may ask why I will not discuss these if they are certain and are of the primary criteria. The reason is that these motives are far loftier and more sublime than what most unbelievers can understand, with their darkened and obstinate minds. Just as when we say an intellectual and moral miracle far surpasses a physical miracle, many people cannot easily understand this. Aristotle says¹⁷, “The supreme causes of things are those that are the most intelligible… and they are known by men with the greatest of difficulty, for they are utterly remote from the senses”. Likewise, this is intended to be more brief article, explicating the external-intrinsic motives which include sublimity of the doctrine proposed, from the holiness of the religion’s founder, its apostles, and its martyrs, its astonishing and miraculous propagation, from its fruitfulness in all that is good, from its catholic unity, and, from its unconquered stability, will destroy the briefness of this article.

Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange nicely puts it all for me¹⁸:

Hence, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, in apologetics, an extrinsic-external methodology is easier, briefer, and safer. For it is easier, when speaking to the simple, to set forth obvious, splendid miracles (like Christ’s Resurrection), supported by the testimony of many people, than it is to set forth the characteristics by which the excellence and sublimity of religion is recognized. This methodology is also briefer, for having already demonstrated that the truth of revealed religion is sufficiently evident on the basis of some miracle (e.g., Christ’s Resurrection), the obligation to embrace it is thereby already clear enough, without needing to set forth the miraculous life of the Church through the whole of history, as well as the sublimity of her doctrine by diligently examining each of her dogmas and precepts. Finally, it is safer, for there is less danger of error involved in investigating into sensible facts like miracles than there is in carefully considering the exceeding excellence, purity, and immunity from error belonging to some doctrine, or in considering the moral effects of this doctrine. This is especially the case because many dogmas remain very obscure, like that of the Holy Trinity, original sin, predestination, and eternal punishment. Hence, the Vatican Council places among “external arguments for revelation, namely divine facts... miracles and prophecies in particular, which since they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God are the most certain signs of the divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men.” Indeed, they are the most befitting of signs, considering matters from our own perspective.

He then goes on to say:

However, IN ITSELF, the miraculous life of the Church is a loftier motive, just as an intellectual and moral miracle is loftier than a physical one. Hence, St. Thomas, in SCG I, ch. 6, after enumerating sensible miracles—namely, “the miraculous curing of the weak, the raising of the dead, and alteration of heavenly bodies”—adds: “And what is more miraculous, there is the inspiration of human minds, leading simple and unlearned men, filled with the Holy Spirit, to possess at a single stroke the heights of wisdom and eloquence.” And immediately afterwards he says concerning the miraculous conversion of the world to the Christian faith: “By which, the minds of mortals were led to assent to these things, and here we have the greatest of miracles, one that likewise is a manifest work of the divine inspiration, so that men would come to seek that which is invisible, doing so in contempt of that which is visible.” Likewise, the Vatican Council says that the Church’s miraculous life is not only a motive of credibility but, indeed, “a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable testimony of her divine mission.” In this perpetuity, she surpasses all properly sensible miracles.

With this being established,

ON THE EXTERNAL-EXTRINSIC MOTIVES OF CREDIBILITY.

MIRACLES.¹⁹ The term miracle is taken from the word mirando (marveling), says the Angelic Doctor²⁰. Two conditions are required for marveling. Firstly, the cause must be hidden; secondly, the effect about which we marvel exhibits the opposite effect of what commonly occurs. When these two concur and obtain, we say something marvelous or wondrous has happened.

Marvels are twofold according to the way in WHICH that cause is hidden: secundum quid and simpliciter. For the former, they are secundum quid unusual and have a cause which is secundum quid hidden; the latter is when the unusual is simpliciter hidden and has a cause that is simpliciter hidden.

The first kind are called marvels; the latter may be called miracles. Now, this simpliciter unusual event must be beyond a particular order or line, or otherwise, as St. Thomas says, a stone getting thrown in the air will be a miracle. So rather, it must be beyond the universal order or line. Likewise, the cause, which is simpliciter hidden (meaning it is invisible), is not only according to the senses but rather to all created or creatable intellects. We therefore and easily infer that this cause is God, and Him alone. This is gathered from the fact that His essence is the only one which is unknown to all created or creatable intellects.

IT IS IMPORTANT to understand how supernatural a miracle is. A miracle is above all powers of the created order. Thus, angels cannot produce them, nor can nature, nor demons. Authors of the like of Le Grand and La Hogue say a miracle is simply that which exceeds all human power, but not angels and demons; this must be rejected as not only an absurdity but also as a heresy according to Vatican I.

MIRACLES ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS. The Doctor says²¹, "a miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone’s nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles”.

As defined, a miracle is a fact which is produced by God in the world, outside the order of action that belongs to the whole of created nature. We must understand its parts. I) It said to be produced by God, meaning God is the principal cause of miracles; however, in His providence, He can instrumentally use creatures for miracles; II) It is said to be in the world; this is because they are intended to affect humanity; III) It is outside the order, because nothing in nature can produce one; IV) that belongs to the whole of created nature, it is said to be outside the order of action, not of being, for the miraculous effect effectively exceeds all created powers but does not entitatively exceed all created natures. Only GRACE, which is intrinsically and entitatively supernatural, does something of this sort because it is a participation of the DIVINE nature; and GRACE exceeds the order of being of the whole of created nature. On the contrary, however, bodily resurrection supernaturally bestows natural life upon a corpse, not supernatural life.

All points here may seem obvious except for point IV. So it requires an explanation. We distinguish order into three: the particular order of a nature; the universal order of all things; the most universal order of divine providence. It is clear that a miracle strictly taken is beyond any particular order and beyond the universal order; but in no way is it beyond the most universal order. This is simply proven when we understand that the ratio of order is that preordination from the knowledge and will of God, which directs all things towards His goodness as to their end. So if it were said that a miracle is against order and its ratio, that means one of three things: it is not willed by God; it is not comprehended by the divine knowledge; or it is not ordered to the divine goodness.

But all of these are impossible for these reasons: creatures come from God's will most freely out of an infinite liberty, and so it is impossible for God to do something that He does not will; nothing may be made by Him which His knowledge does not comprehend or know, because before God wills something, He knows it completely and most perfectly. And likewise, it is not possible for God to do something in creatures which is not ordered to His goodness as to its end; this is because His goodness is the proper and primary object of His will. We therefore infer from all of these points that a miracle is not beyond the ratio of order.

THE PROBATIVE FORCE OF MIRACLES. Here we are asking whether miracles are motives of credibility with a real value for a criterion of revelation. Note, to explain this section, I first suppose against some that we can truly discern the fact of miracles and that they are possible from God's infinite power, whereby He is bound by nothing. A treatment of this is already extensively covered by the theologians. However, I add this section because some, such as the Modernists who pretend to be Christians and likewise the Protestants, think miracles prove absolutely nothing; this is utterly ridiculous and to be rejected by both common sense and the faith. Our Lord told the doubters believe the works; He proved He was a divine legate by miracles, and so did His holy Apostles, and the Fathers of the Church appealed to them constantly for proof of the divine origin of Christianity²².

CATHOLIC POSITION. In the two texts below you will see that the Church establishes two points. Miracles are one of the means that God uses to manifest what He intends to reveal because divina revelationis signa sunt certissima (“the signs of divine revelation are most certain”). And the second point established is that the miracle is a sign which is easily recognizable by all, signa omnium intelligentiae accommodata.

For the first part, we find in the text of the Vatican I Council ²³, “Miracles… since they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of the divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men”.

Vacant commenting on Vatican I intention for miracles is said in études théologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican d’après les actes du concile, vol. 2 (Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895), 41:

The Council presupposes that all miracles have God as their cause. Indeed, it places miracles among the order of divine facts, facta divina. It does not admit a broader notion of miracles, one introduced by modern apologists, extending the qualification of ‘miracle’ to facts that surpass man’s powers, as well as those of sensible creatures—and, by consequence, to the interventions of angels and demons in our universe—along with God’s interventions. This notion, thought up in order to deal with the difficulty experienced with regard to the problem of distinguishing angelic or diabolic deeds from those of God, does not in fact resolve this difficulty. Moreover, it has the disadvantage of giving the word ‘miracle’ a new acceptation, for it confuses the miraculous with angelic and demonic marvels.

For the second part, Holy Lord Pope St. Pius X in his Anti-Modernist oath says, “Second, I accept and acknowledge external arguments of revelation, that is, divine deeds, in particular miracles and prophecies, as utterly certain signs of the divine origin of the Christian religion, and I hold that they are most excellently adapted to the understanding of all eras and men (signa omnium intelligentiae accommodata), even of our own days.” Both of these are to be considered a matter of divine and Catholic faith.

ARGUMENTS FROM MIRACLES ARE NOT FROM A DIRECT DEMONSTRATION A PRIORI, NOR ARE THEY DIRECT ARGUMENTS A POSTERIORI, BUT IT IS AN INDIRECT ARGUMENT BASED ON THE VERY CERTITUDE OF THE SIGN²⁴. They are not direct demonstrations from proper cause, and when we demonstrate the soul is immortal from its immaterial root, nor is it a demonstration from proper effect, and when we prove God's existence from His effects. It is rather an argument from the certitude of the sign, an indirect demonstration drawn from the very certainty of the sign, a demonstration that infers and demonstrates the truth of the fact or doctrine on account of the absurdities that would follow from the contrary hypothesis.

ST. THOMAS SHOWS THAT AN ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES IS A PROOF THROUGH A SIGN (EX SIGNO)²⁵:

There are two sorts of arguments. Sometimes, the term “argument” is used to indicate any kind of ratio giving faith (i.e., certitude) concerning a matter that is in doubt, whereas at other times it refers to a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth, just as Aristotle himself also sometimes uses the term in his works (Cf. Prior Analytics, bk. 2; Rhetoric, bk. 1). Therefore, taking the term “argument” in the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by way of argument (because what exceeds human reason cannot be proven through human accounts)... However, if the term is taken in the second sense, Christ is thus said to have declared His Resurrection by means of arguments, inasmuch as He showed, through certain evident signs, that He resurrected (or that He was sent by God).

The Angelic Doctor likewise shows that these arguments from miracles are certain to the point where one cannot prudently dissent from²⁶:

Because those things that are of faith exceed human reason, they cannot be proven through human reasons but, rather, must be proven through arguments drawn from the divine power, so that when someone performs works that only God can do, we may believe that the things that he says are themselves from God. This is akin to when someone brings letters, signed by the king’s ring, thus leading one to believe that what is contained in those letters does indeed proceed from the king’s will.

The Common Doctor also says quite elegantly²⁷:

It cannot happen that someone who announces a false teaching would perform true miracles, which can only be brought about by the divine power, for were matters otherwise, God would be the witness to falsehood, which is impossible.

From these texts, we can easily see the reason miracles have a probative force. From the foundation of an utterly certain sign, we reduce the argument into an impossibility or absurdity: “God would be the witness to falsehood…”

PROOF OF THE PROBATIVE VALUE²⁸. On this matter, see Holy Lord Pope Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione, vol. IV, part i, c. iv; and the Salmanticenses, De fide, disp. II, dub. iii, § 6.

As an argument from miracles is indirect, in this way we look for the foundation of the demonstrative value. I therefore say. On the supposition that a miracle didn't have any demonstrative value, one must necessarily concede that God could, by performing it, attest to the truth of an error. However, this contradicts God as the first truth, supreme good; therefore, it is absurd.

Certainly, as was said above, only a miracle can be performed by the divine omnipotence directed by the infinite wisdom of God with His providence. I likewise say that because providence extends not only to the reality of the miracle itself but also to all the conditions under which the miracle-worker performs it, which is the connection that the miracle-worker sets up between the miracle and the truth of a doctrine he proclaims. I infer now that if this doctrine were not the truth as God wills it to be proclaimed to men, it now follows that God would will, or at least would permit (which wholly contradicts Him as First Truth), that through this miracle, an attestation which is furnished by His providence and omnipotence in favor of an error or a merely human word falsely presented as a divine word.

The foundation for this is that a miracle is connected, whether explicitly or implicitly, with a revealed doctrine that the miracle comes forth to confirm. If it isn't connected to a teaching, it is only a miraculous intervention by God; it would not be a fitting sign to confirm a teaching. It is explicit when the one doing the work himself affirms that the miracle is performed to prove the truth of his teaching. It is implicit, yet still manifest, when it appears from the circumstances of the miracle that it comes as testimony to the veracity of the miracle-worker or to the truth of his teaching. For explicit connection see Exodus 4:1-19; Luke 5: 23-24; Mark 2: 9-11; John 11: 41-43; Matthew 11: 5-6.

Most of the miracles of Christ had only an implicit connection with the truth of His teaching. Yet Fillion says in Les miracles de N.-S. Jésus-Christ, vol. I, p. 2:

By multiplying his wonders, Jesus proved that he was the one sent by God, and that consequently his teaching, however transcendent and mysterious it might sometimes be, could be regarded as also coming from on high. Usually, no doubt, there is no immediate, intrinsic relation between his miracles and his preaching; but this was in no way necessary: the same credentials recommended both the person and the doctrine.

From all of this we easily conclude that miracles have a firm foundation as an utterly certain sign whereby God manifests a doctrine to be revealed and truth. In one word, to summarize the entire demonstration:

God would be a witness to falsehood, if a legate proposes a doctrine as revealed by God, but not truly receiving this doctrine as something revealed by God. And so it follows that both the inference and antecedent are wrong; thus, we have the indirect argument which flows from absurdity for the probative force of miracles being a true criterion for revelation;-

The foundation is simply: only God can bring about a miracle, and as we have said, it extends to not only the very substance of the miracle, but also all of its conditions and circumstances. Therefore it is rightly inferred²⁹: if a true miracle is indeed performed, along with all the circumstances that bear witness to the fact that it is done in confirmation of revelation, all the while without revelation actually being made, then God who alone can bring about a true miracle would be a witness to falsehood, either intentionally or at least permissively, inasmuch as he would thus have permitted a false prophet to misuse a true miracle.

DIVISIONS OF MIRACLE ACCORDING TO HOW THEY EXCEED NATURE³⁰. We divide a miracle comparatively from the power of nature. So the more nature's power is exceeded, the greater the miracle.

Something exceeds nature in three ways, as far as its substance (quantum ad substantiam facti), as far as its subject (quantum ad subiectum in quo fit), and as far as its mode (quantum ad modum). So then the division of miracles is threefold, as far as their substance, as far as their subject, and as far as their mode.

In the first, the miracle exceeds the power of nature as far as the substance of the event, when that which occurs can in no way be brought about by nature. For instance, the mutual penetration of bodies (two bodies occupying the same place), or transubstantiation, or the glorification of bodies. These are miracles in the greatest degree.

In the second, it is a miracle when it exceeds the power of nature as far as the subject, when that which occurs can be done by nature, but not in a given subject. For instance, giving sight to the blind, or the resurrection of the dead. Nature can indeed give sight, but not to the blind, and nature can indeed give life, but not to a corpse. These exceed the power of nature, not in what is done but in the subject of its activity. These are miracles in the second degree.

In the third, it exceeds nature’s power in the manner and order in which it is done, or if you will, the mode and order of production (quoad modum et ordinem faciendi), but not in that given way. For instance, when one is suddenly cured completely of a sickness that would otherwise not have been cured without receiving proper medicine, without having the natural bodily course of recovery, etc. These hold the lowest degree of miracles. See St. Thomas' divisions as well on the miracles above nature, against nature, or beyond nature, in II Sent. d. 18, q. 1, a. 3 and De potentia q. 6, a. 2, ad 3.

DIVISION ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY MIRACULOUS (MIRACULUM QUOAD SUBSTANTIAM) AND THAT WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY SUPERNATURAL (SUPERNATURALE QUOAD SUBSTANTIAM)³¹. It is worthy to note here the twofold difference, it is of utter importance one does not identify these two together. What is substantially miraculous (the category of miracles we gave above) is only modally and effectively supernatural, according to efficient causality, which is in relation to the way in which it is produced. The substantially miraculous is not essentially and entitatively supernatural because it is derived from extrinsic causes, whether on the part of the end or on the part of efficient causality. That which is essentially supernatural³² is that which is intrinsically and not modally or effectively supernatural, meaning that it exceeds not only, from the perspective of causality, all the efficiently causal powers and exigencies of any given created nature but also exceeds, by its intrinsic supernatural entity, every created nature, since it is either the divine nature or a participation in the divine nature precisely as divine; such the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the Light of Glory, the infused virtues, and habitual and actual grace.

THE PROPERTIES of miracles are sixfold; even though most of these can be deduced from has been said above, it is helpful to keep these in an orderly fashion to mind: I) they are arduous because they wholly exceed the created order; II) they are outside of the hopes or exigencies of nature because nature is not ordered to them, only obediently insofar as God's power; III) they are not customary because it stands outside of the ordinary course of natural activity; IV) they are not contrary to nature. Nature has a primary aptitude by which any given creature naturally obeys God to accept whatever he may will through its passive obediential potency; V) they are natural signs because they manifest something supernatural; VI) marvels on account of their excellence.

It is asked. Whether a miracle is against nature? Reply. I distinguish that which is against something secundum quid or simpliciter. The former is simply when something occurs that is contrary to its aptitudinal potency or inclination that exists in a thing. In the latter, it is said to be against something simpliciter when it applies violence to the nature. I concede in the first way that they are against nature, that is, according to which nature does not incline towards them; however, I deny they are said to be against nature simpliciter.

Confirmation³³. “For, since God is pure act, but all other things have some admixture of potency, it follows that God must be compared to all things as the mover to the thing moved and as the active to the potential. Now, when that which in the natural order is in potency concerning a certain agent is acted upon by that agent, this is not contrary to nature simply, although sometimes it is contrary to that particular form which is corrupted by such action. Thus, when fire is generated and air is corrupted through the action of the fire, both generation and corruption are natural. Consequently, whatever is done by God in created things is not contrary to nature, although it may seem to be contrary to the order proper to a particular nature.”

Explanation. All created things have a potency, which can be moved by God beyond the order of their causes, and so, because all created things in nature have an admixture of potency and act, God is to all things as something active to that which is in potency. Hence, when God performs in creatures a miracle, which is indeed beyond the order of their own causes, it is not against nature but natural.

It is asked³⁴. What is potency? Reply. We distinguish objective potency from subjective. A distinction not seen too much in today's time. Objective potency designates merely a possibility for something to exist; it has a non-repugnance to existence, therefore is called simply possible. Subjective potency, on the other hand, which presupposes simple possibility, is the subject’s aptitude or real principle for acting or undergoing something. Hence, Aristotle says it is the principle of acting or of receiving. Man has the subjective potency to understand and learn, while a stone in no way has that potency.

Now because it is the principle of acting or receiving, we see the clear division between active and passive. Active potency is a principle of action, and the potency of receiving is passive. As the fire is the principle of acting, in causing heat, water is the principle of receiving because it takes heat from the fire. Both are principles of act; however, the first is the principle from which the act emanates, or principium a quo, and the second, the principle into which the act is received, or principium in quod.

We further distinguish passive potency into natural and obediential. The first is related to a natural agent; the latter is that potency that is related to the First Agent, who can reduce any creature to some act that is higher than what it can be reduced to by a natural agent. Consider that in the intellect, there is a natural potency where it receives the intelligible species, which is abstracted from sensible things.

Please note that obediential potency designates an order to an agent of a superior nature, which it obeys. This passivity is divided into the relation to a created agent; for instance, the wood in relation to a carpenter receives from his craft the form of a table, which this potency does not exist in water. And secondly, passivity can be considered in relation to an absolutely supernatural agent. Therefore, this obediential potency is whereby human nature may be raised to the Supernatural Order.

Yet this obediential potency can be considered either from God as the Author of nature, for instance when a man receives the capability to do a miraculous work, or when a corpse receives bodily resurrection, this is from God the Author of bodily life; or it can be considered as from God the Author of supernatural life, whereby as Author of supernatural life He elevates a rational creature to supernatural life through His sanctifying grace, and not merely natural life.

Now that we have discussed the miracles, it is worthy to move to the next motive of the external-extrinsic criteria, prophecy. Thus,

ON PROPHECY. To understand what this word designates, we must first seek its etymology and historical understanding, since to arrive at a good definition we must start from the nominal root and from that we derive its real and proper definition through its proximate genus and specific difference.

THE GREEK³⁵ word προφήτης from προφάναι corresponds to the Hebrew nâbi, which can mean either interpreter, herald, spokesman, or again to rô'é or hôzè, “seer.” And in this way Aaron is to be designated by God as the “prophet” of Moses³⁶. The prophet speaks for another, in this case one who speaks to men in God's name. In this way, it therefore means that to prophesy is exactly the same as proclaiming, with speaking forth, and in this sense prophecy is equivalent to revelation.

It is in this general sense that it derives what it means either broadly or strictly:

A. In the broadest sense, everything which is uttered under the influence of a divine instinct is reputed prophecy. Or also any discourse concerning divine things, or even the very singing of divine praises and prophecies in the Church which St. Paul speaks of in Romans 12:6; 1 Corinthians 12:10, 28, etc.

B. In the stricter sense, it is the knowledge of hidden things or events which cannot naturally be known to man, whether present or future. In this way we can say Moses prophesied by telling us about the origin of the world. And so in this way it is the supernatural knowledge of hidden things or of the secrets of the heart, and when Elisha knew Gehazi did when he wasn't there.

C. In the most strict sense, it must be distinguished from those charisms or graces of supernatural knowledge that don't concern the future, and hence we define prophecy as the supernaturally communicated knowledge and the infallible prediction of future events that are naturally unforeseeable. So in this way, they are distinct from natural conjecture and the power of demons, which is called divination. Prophecies are of the intellectual order; just as miracles display God's infinite omnipotence, so then prophecy displays God's infinite knowledge.

Now that we have arrived at the proper definition, we must understand its division, but before that we must understand the object of prophecy because knowledge is specified by its proper object. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange explains³⁷:

Now, to this end, in ST. II-II, q. 171, a. 3, St. Thomas distinguishes those things that are at a distance: I) as regards their place, II) on account of the shortcomings of human knowledge (thus, including supernatural mysteries hidden in God), and III) on account of their indetermination (thus, including future contingents). And the last are, of themselves, most greatly distant and therefore constitute the proper object of prophecy.

He then quotes the text of St. Thomas, which says:

We must consider the fact that, given that prophecy is concerned with those things that are distant from our knowledge, the more remote things are from our knowledge, the more do they pertain to prophecy. Now, there are three degrees of such things. The first such degree includes things that are distant from some particular man’s knowledge, whether sensitive or intellective, but not from the knowledge of all men. Thus, by his senses, a particular man knows things that are present to him as regards their place, though another man does not know of them by human sense, given the fact that they are removed from him. Thus, Elisha prophetically knew what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (2 Kgs 5:26), and similarly, one man’s secret thoughts of the heart are prophetically manifested to another, according to 1 Corinthians 14:25. Likewise, in this way, what one man knows by way of demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.

The second degree of such distance includes those things which surpass the knowledge which is possible for all men, not meaning that they themselves are unknowable but, rather, on account of a shortcoming in human knowledge. Such things include the mystery of the Trinity...

The final degree includes things distant from the knowledge of all men by being intrinsically unknowable. Such are future contingents, whose truth is indeterminate. Now, since that which holds universally and by something’s very nature takes precedence of that which holds in a limited and relative sense, it follows that the revelation of future events is what is most proper to prophecy, thus seemingly giving “prophecy” its name. Hence, Gregory says (Homily I on Ezekiel): “And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its meaning when he speaks of the past or present.”

According to a better etymology, seeing the connection of prophecy with προφάναι (to speak on behalf of someone, to speak as representing another), the threefold gradation of prophecy can be expressed as follows. Prophecy in the broad sense is to speak in the name of God or by a divine instinct (see Exod 7:1; 1 Cor 14; passim.). However, because things said by a divine instinct are especially naturally hidden from human reason, prophecy therefore understood in a stricter sense is the communication of divine hidden things, be they in the past, present, or future (see Matt 24:8). Finally, because future contingents are most hidden, therefore, the strictest sense of the term prophecy is the announcing of these future things.

From all of these points, we infer the definition: the infallible foretelling of a future contingent happening, which can be foreseen with certainty only by means of a supernatural light.

It is called infallible to distinguish it from human conjecture (“by means of which non-necessary future things can be foreseen with some probability”) and from the divination of spirits (“which is always fallible as regards future contingents”).

Secondly, it is said to be the foretelling of a future contingent happening; this foretelling principally includes both the foreknowledge and, secondarily, the speaking of it. “Now, there are two senses to the term future contingent,” says Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, “broadly speaking, a future contingent sometimes seeks to exist of its very nature but is naturally able to be impeded through the concurrence of other causes, like when someone lives for a long time because of his robust physical makeup. However, properly and strictly speaking, a future contingent is that which, of its very nature, is indifferent to being and non-being, as are things that depend upon free choice of the will. Now, the object of prophecy, strictly so-called, is that which is a future contingent, properly speaking.”

It is said to be what can be foreseen only by means of a supernatural light. This is what is required subjectively for prophetic knowledge. And on account of its pure indeterminacy, this future contingent can only be known with certitude by God.

St. Thomas on this point says³⁸: "Therefore, since prophecy extends to knowledge which is above natural knowledge, it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light exceeding the light of reason.”

THREE COROLLARIES. I) This prophetic light exists as something impressed upon the soul in a passing manner³⁹. Or simply the prophetic light is a transient impression. II) Prophetic knowledge involves two things, which are a) the representation of a future contingent thing and b) infallible judgment concerning this thing. III) The principal element in prophetic revelation is the supernatural light, not the representation of a future contingent event. Representations were given to Pharaoh, to Nabuchodonosor, to Baltassar, etc., and they were not prophets.

IN A WORD, to summarize what was said above⁴⁰. Prophecy consists first and principally in cognition, which is that prophets know things distant and remote from human knowledge. Prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as prophets announce to others. Prophecy narrowly is the manifestation of a future thing hidden from creatures. From this prophecy has three conditions: I) that it be a sure and certain prediction, not conjectural; II) that it be a prediction of a future contingent thing, which accordingly can be known neither by art nor by any natural science whatever; III) that it be so determinate that the event is not accommodated to the prophecy, but rather the prophecy determines the event: that is, that it not be so vague, obscure, and equivocal as to fit any event whatsoever, and its application not arbitrary; so that prophecy, which is a true miracle, supplies its proof.

THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY⁴¹. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange has given a superb schema where he lists all the divisions in his section on prophecy. However, I will draw directly from the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, art. "PROPHETIE.” This division offers an excellent explication of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's schema:

Prophecy can be considered, as to its object, the future event announced and, as to its subject, the mode of knowledge in the prophet.

a) By reason of the object known:

— a. As to the extent of the knowledge of the future event: prophecy determines or does not determine the very time when the event will occur, the divine origin of the prophecy itself, and the meaning of the thing prophesied.

— b. As to the very nature of the future event: if it concerns an absolute future, prophecy of foreknowledge. If it concerns a conditional future, prophecy of menace (threat).

b) By reason of the mode of knowledge:

— a. Formally: Prophecy by intellectual vision. Prophecy by imaginative vision. Prophecy by sensible vision.

— b. Materially: Prophecy in the waking state. Prophecy in ecstasy or rapture. Prophecy in sleep.

a) Division by reason of the object. — a. With regard to the extent of the knowledge of this object, prophecy admits of four degrees of decreasing perfection.

The first, the most perfect, involves the knowledge of the future event, of the time when it will occur, of the prophetic meaning of this event, and of the divine origin of the prophecy. An extremely rare case. ⁴²

The second degree involves the knowledge of the future event, of its meaning, of the divine origin of the prophecy, but not of the time when this event will occur. This indeterminacy results frequently from the lack of historical perspective in the prophecies, as explained above. ⁴³

The third degree involves simply the knowledge of the future event and of its prophetic meaning, but the divine origin of the prophecy and the time of its fulfillment are unknown. ⁴⁴

The fourth degree involves only the announcement of a future event, but the prophet is unaware of the divine origin of his prophecy and even of the meaning of the thing announced. This is the case of Caiaphas.

As for the meaning of the thing announced, and by reason of its supernaturality or its purely natural character, prophecy says Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange further involves two degrees: either it implies a supernatural light as to its substance, if it is a prophecy concerning a mystery of the faith, or it makes do with a simple supernatural light as to its mode if it concerns an event of the natural order.

b. With regard to the nature of the future fact announced, prophecy is subdivided into prophecy of foreknowledge or prophecy of menace.

Prophecy of foreknowledge, or absolute prophecy, attains its predicted object in its very reality and is always fulfilled. Prophecy of menace simply marks the relationship of causes to effects; it signifies “that the disposition of the inferior causes, whether it concerns natural events or human acts, is such that the predicted effect must result from it.” The event does not always occur exactly as it was announced; this prophecy is only hypothetical, for our prayers, our mortifications, our sacrifices—all things foreseen by God within the order of causes to effects. ⁴⁵

b) By reason of the mode of knowledge, prophecy can be considered either formally or materially.

a. Formally, it is divided into prophecy by intellectual, imaginative, or sensible vision.

Intellectual vision renders prophecy more perfect in itself, for “the manifestation of divine truth in the pure contemplation of truth is superior to every manifestation of that same truth under the image of corporeal things; it more closely resembles the heavenly vision, which sees truth in the divine essence.” Ibid., q. 174, a. 2. Nevertheless, “because prophecy implies a certain obscurity and a certain remoteness from intelligible truth, one gives, in a more proper sense, the name of prophet to one who sees by means of imaginative vision.” A. 3.

Imaginative vision occurs either with the help of imaginary forms imprinted in the interior senses. ⁴⁶

Prophecy by simple sensible vision is that in which the prophet receives communication of the truth by the very means of his external senses. ⁴⁷

b. Materially, prophecy is fulfilled in one of three possible states: the state of waking, the state of ecstasy or rapture, the state of sleep. ⁴⁸

ON THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF PROPHECIES. The Catholic position was decreed in Vatican I. The Holy Council says ⁴⁹: “[Prophecies] manifestly display the… infinite knowledge of God and are the most certain signs of the divine revelation adapted to the intelligence of all men.” The Council clearly declares that the argument drawn from prophecies must be ranked among the arguments omnium intelligentiae accommodata. Likewise, St. Matthew through his Gospel displays the very probative force of prophecy by appealing to them constantly. See 1:22-23; 8:17; 12:17-21; etc.

A prophecy is also to be considered as a miracle, indeed only differing in order, as the former pertains to the intellectual, whilst the latter is sensible and physical. Vacant teaches well in Études théologiques sur les constitutions du concile du Vatican, vol. ii, n. 586:

The proof of revelation by the prophetic announcement of the future is (therefore) no less certain than the proof by miracles of the physical order.

Note two things.

A. Prophecy is a divine fact. It is a fact of the intellectual order, the manifestation of a truth known to God alone. It is a divine and preternatural manifestation, by way of revelation. It is a sensible manifestation (external one) such that it can become, for everyone, a proof of the divinity of Christianity.

B. Prophecies are like miracles, arguments of revelation, and are, because they manifest divine omnipotence and infinite knowledge, utterly certain signs.

One may dispute the point that God alone can give knowledge of the future contingent and its demonstration. The demonstration that God alone can give such prophetic knowledge is already contained in what was said about these facts:

Prophecy is foreknowledge and infallible preaching concerning future contingents, as something essentially distinct from conjecture regarding future things. Now, only God can, by His own proper power, infallibly know future contingents. Therefore, God alone can, by his own power, give man prophetic knowledge of future contingents.

You cannot press the major, as it is the very definition of prophecy.

Nor can you press the minor because God alone is an utterly universal and eternal cause, Himself alone in being perfectly immutable, above the successive flow of thoughts. In God there is omniscience and therefore foreknowledge. If God did not have this foreknowledge, He would not be infinitely perfect under this respect and consequently would not be God.

It is, of course, to be conceded, in a conjectural manner, that angels know future contingents in their causes. However, this conjecture is essentially different from the infallible knowledge had by the prophet in whom God communicates, and so it is inferred that knowledge, and therefore, can only be communicated to him by God.

From these points, anyone, no matter their intellectual skill, can see the probative force of prophecy: their free decisions could not be known in advance by any natural means, and that consequently God alone can foresee them. It is, moreover, easy for them to establish the existence of a genuine prophecy: it is sufficient for this, as shown above, to establish two facts—on the one hand, the prediction of a future event, naturally unforeseeable, made more or less long before the event's occurrence. On the other hand, this very occurrence came about in the manner in which it had been announced in advance.

We can also argue using Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange in this manner:

A properly divine sign confirms with the greatest certitude the divine revelation on account of which it was performed. Prophecy is a properly divine sign inasmuch as it can come solely from God. Therefore, prophecy performed in confirmation of revelation confirms this with utter certitude. Indeed, prophecy directly and manifestly displays God’s infinite knowledge, which alone extends to future contingents, just as miracles directly manifest God’s divine omnipotence.

Thus, the probative force of prophecies has been demonstrated. Directly, insofar as prophecy being fulfilled directly shows the infinite knowledge of God, just as a miracle shows the Divine omnipotence. And indirectly, insofar as God cannot be a witness to falsehood, because the connection between the prophecy and the revealed doctrine is confirmed by the prophet, whether explicitly or implicitly.

THE ACT OF FAITH. Before we understand this section, we must understand its main part: faith.

GENERAL NOTION OF FAITH. It is an obvious fact that we cannot know all things immediately through our own individual powers and capacity; for instance, I know the sun is 149,6 million km away from the earth. I certainly am not certified enough to calculate the distance myself, along with the fact that I do not have the necessary equipment to even do so. So why do I know? Simply because of the testimony from the ones who are skilled and certified enough to do so.

Hence, we must have recourse to the testimony of other people unless one wants to destroy all knowledge and deprive oneself of the most basic facts we know from the testimony of others. These people we appeal to for external matters are called witnesses. A witness reports to another person a thing known to him. There are many types: eyewitness, earwitness, immediate, and mediate, according to whether he narrates he saw it himself or through another. This witness could be contemporary if he was there at the same time as the fact or a near-contemporary if it wasn't long after or remote if later. Whenever a witness reports something to another, that act is called testimony. The one who testifies is either divine or human. The matter of the testimony is either historical or dogmatic. The mode by which the narration takes place is either written or oral. And because testimony isn't propagated only to the immediate contemporaries, it is transmitted after the fact through various media. These media are oral tradition (transmission of a fact by word of mouth through a continuous succession posterior to the fact), documents (a fact narrated in writing, which constitutes the principal source of history), and monuments (paintings, temples, coins, churches, inscriptions, etc.).

Now, correlative to testimony in the hearer is what we call faith: the assent by which we hold to be true the things narrated, on account of the authority of the one testifying. Because assent that rests upon the testimony of another lacks the intrinsic character of evidence, the most formal definition is this: the assent of the intellect by which we believe to be true what we receive from external testimony, on account of the authority of a witness who neither deceives nor is deceived.

AUTHORITY. Authority signifies the force of testimony for obtaining assent from hearers, and by it the witness is rendered worthy of faith. Authority is complex, composed of two notions: veracity and the knowledge of the witness. The Angelic Doctor says, ⁵⁰ “For that someone is not believed happens from two causes: either because he is or is reputed to be ignorant, or because he is or is reputed to be a liar.”

THE FORMAL AND MATERIAL OBJECT OF FAITH. Faith denotes a twofold relation. The witness or the testimony of the very person to whom, or on account of whom, the thing is believed. The thing that is being believed, the propositions, facts, etc., that are being passed over by the witness. The first relation is the formal object, or that determination by which a thing attains its material object. The second relation is the material object.

When we assent to a fact narrated by a witness, we at least implicitly profess and acknowledge the authority of the one testifying. Or recognizing and declaring his knowledge and veracity. Otherwise that assent will be vain and rash, not worthy of any belief whatsoever, for he cannot gather any solid motives or reasons why he assents. As indicated, before we make an assent, another act precedes that assent. That act is deciding whether the fact that is being assented to is worthy of faith in the first place. One must have previous knowledge of the existence and authority of the testimony, which is the motive of faith. This is called the judgment of credibility. It is the very foundation for faith itself.

Now, whether that narration is worthy of belief, we consider two things: the fact of testimony, and the authority of the witness. This determines the degree of moral certitude we have in the witness. Fr. Urráburu says ⁵¹, “Sometimes both the existence and the authority of testimony are known certainly and evidently; sometimes, however, only probably and by conjecture. Sometimes the testimony is evident, while the authority is obscure or even uncertain; sometimes, on the contrary, there is no doubt at all concerning the authority, but the very existence of the testimony is not manifest.”

Because faith per se depends on the authority of testimony as its formal object, one must consider all of these points and motives and duly weigh them so that a prudent judgment can be made regarding the firmness of faith.

THEOLOGICAL NOTION OF FAITH. In today's society, when one is asked what “faith” is, they tend to reply that faith is a blind assent, pure religious sentiment, a mere opinion true only to the person in whom it inheres, not binding on the one who asks, has no obligatory or necessary use in society, etc. All of these are responses that commit the grave sin and heresy of modernism (see Pascendi Dominici Gregis, by Our Holy Lord St. Pius X); it is based on its foundations: subjectivism, relativism, liberalism, and so on.

Catholics, on the contrary, have a firm and rich definition of faith.

The Holy Vatican I Council says faith is thus⁵²: “Faith, which is the beginning of man’s salvation, is a supernatural virtue whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that what He has revealed is true, not because the intrinsic truth of things is recognized by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself who reveals them, who can neither err nor deceive. For faith, as the apostle testifies, is “the substance of things hoped for, the proof of things not seen” (Heb 11:1).”

Faith here signifies the ACT of faith, not the HABIT of faith. The habit of faith is a supernatural and a theological virtue that disposes the mind to assent firmly to all that God has revealed, because of divine authority. The act of faith we speak of is the supernatural assent of the intellect, which is utterly free, by which we believe the truth revealed by God on account of the authority of God who reveals. We can likewise formulate more commonly in this way: the act of faith is the supernatural assent by which the intellect, under the command of the will and the influence of grace, firmly accepts revealed truths because of the authority of God who is revealing.

This act is of the intellect, so it is not a religious sentiment; it is indeed under the command of the will, so it is free; this assent is really and entitatively supernatural; grace illumines the intellect and inspires the will; indeed the certitude of this assent is so firm, that we have a greater and more intense certainty in our faith than all metaphysical, physical, and moral certitudes combined. This is on account of its motive: God, who reveals, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, from whom all objects of certitude derive their being. How great is the Catholic faith, indeed; we do not assent because of the “intrinsic truth of things is recognized by the natural light of reason” against the semi-rationalist; we assent because of the “authority of God who is revealing”. When someone asks a Catholic, “What is the reason for your faith in the Trinity?” he must not respond with “I see no repugnance between the Trinity and the first principles of reason” or “I grew up in the Catholic household,” but rather, “Because God has revealed He is three.”

THE OBJECT OF SUPERNATURAL FAITH⁵³. Catholics affirm there are three objects. The formal object, which (quod); the formal object by which (sub quo); and the material object.

THE FORMAL OBJECT QUOD is GOD under the aspect of first truth in being and, consequently, under the aspect of Deity. This is because God is not the primary object of faith according to some special intrinsic attribute where we conceive Him as Saviour, Creator, etc., but rather according to the absolute nature of Deity in its most intimate aspect, in which confusedly, obscurely, and radically, according to our mode of conceiving, contains all of God's attributes and predicates in an eminent mode.

THE FORMAL OBJECT SUB QUO or the MOTIVE OF FAITH requires that the one who bears witness can neither deceive nor be deceived; and therefore it directly implies the first truth in speaking, so this object is considered as He is both the first truth in knowing which cannot be deceived, and the first truth in speaking which cannot deceive. Or briefly, God’s infallible testimony.

THE MATERIAL OBJECT is simply everything made known to us by Divine Revelation. This is to say indifferently and indistinctly every truth revealed by God. The primary part, which theologians call the object of attribution, is God himself as the supernatural end; the secondary is all the created truths, which are conducive to the attainment of this end. Hence, we have the axiom: secondary things are the object of faith only insofar as they relate to God as their supernatural end.

Note. The material object is not only God but also created things, as there are many things about created things that are believed through faith. For every being revealed, whether it is created or uncreated, they both equally rest on the infallible testimony of God, on account of which it is believed through divine faith. There is no difference in believability and certainty between “The Bl. Virgin was never tainted with original sin,” and “God is three and one.” And likewise, even though the material object is composed of many things, because there are various dogmas, it is nevertheless from all of these truths that they constitute a single adequate object of one faith, because they all agree in one common nature of the thing: to be believed.

THE ACT OF FAITH IS OBSCURE⁵⁴. St. Francis de Sales most divinely says⁵⁵, “God proposes the mysteries of the faith to our soul in darkness and obscurity… And nonetheless, now that this obscure light of faith has entered into our mind, not by the power of discourse, nor through arguments that have been presented to us, but solely through the sweetness of its presence, it makes one believe and obey what is thus understood with such authority that the certitude that it gives us concerning the truth exceeds all worldly forms of certitude.”

St. Paul insinuates this in Hebrews 11:1, where he says that the object of faith is revealed in such a manner that it is not seen: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the proof of things that do not appear.” He likewise says in 1 Corinthians 13:12 that we now see the mysteries of our faith through a mirror and in an enigma: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known”; 2 Corinthians 5:7, “For we walk by faith, and not by sight.”

We wayfarers only have faith, which is known only obscurely and enigmatically. What does it mean for the assent of faith to be obscure? The assent of faith is said to be obscure when it is not evident. Recall what was said above on faith. The assent of faith is taken from the authority of the one who proposes, but this authority has no intrinsic evidence. Indeed, faith excludes evidence of the reality itself, intrinsic principles, and essential principles; it does not, however, exclude evidence as regards the extrinsic aspect that is being revealed but rather requires testimony of God revealing what is established as utterly certain.

Faith is obscure by reason of its motive, i.e., the authority of God revealing. God as revealer does not explain the intrinsic reason of the matter revealed; faith likewise is generally obscure by reason of its object, the principal articles and mysteries wholly exceed reason, inaccessible to all the created and creatable order; however, the obscurity of faith is quite compatible with the perfect evidence and clearness concerning the fact of revelation, such as it was with the Bl. Virgin.

Doubt. If the faith is not evident from its obscurity, how can we be certain of its truths?

Reply. The intrinsic truth or evidence of a proposition is drawn from one source and its credibility from another; both are from two different lines. The first is drawn from that intrinsic connection between subject and predicate, whereas credibility is drawn from extrinsic and competent testimonies and witnesses, signs, and motives that render the proposition credible or worthy of faith. Also, this credibility needs not to be of the metaphysical order of certitude; it only needs to be of the moral order, which excludes reasonable doubt.

Confirmation. The term credibility denotes that extrinsic condition of an object or doctrine by reason of which it is capable of terminating a prudent act of believing on account of the authority of the one who attests it, or simply that which is entirely concerned with the affirmability of some proposition on account of the motive of authority. Let it be noted that we do not distinguish this type of evidence of credibility from truth in its transcendental and most universal sense, because credibility is a type of truth. But in the restricted sense of the truth of the thing in itself. Hence, if I were to say that the Trinity is evident with the evidence of credibility, let it be quite far from me to attribute evidence to the proposition itself by which it is stated that God is three in persons; rather, I am only attributing it to that other proposition by which the Trinity is asserted to be prudently believable with divine faith. ⁵⁶

BEFORE ONE HAS THE SUPERNATURAL CHOICE IN THE WILL TO COMMAND THE INTELLECT TO ASSENT DIVINELY, OTHER ACTS ARE PRESUPPOSED. This part gets a little complicated; Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange lists twelve acts that concur in the act of faith; these twelve acts are the ones which concur in the deliberation and execution of any given proposed act. See St. Thomas's treatment in ST. I–II, q. 8–18.

In order we have,

I) Acts Concerned with the End —

Order of Intention:

1. Judgment (intellect): The ultimate end is at least implicitly known as a desirable good. 2. Desire (will): Desire for the ultimate end—that is, for beatitude. 3. Judgment (intellect): The end can and ought to be pursued: I ought to know, serve, obey, and love God above all things. 4. Intention (will): To the degree that it lies within my power, I sincerely will the ultimate end, salvation, and, hence, will to obey God.

N.B. The ones who have already arrived at 3 and 4 have already performed it under interior grace.

II) Acts Concerned with the Means —

A. In The Order of Choice:

5. Counsel (intellect) concerning the proposed revelation: a) Speculative, remotely practical judgment of credibility: This is credible. b) Speculatively-practical judgment of credentity: This is to be believed by men. 6. Consent (will) to this credibility. This consent is not yet, of itself, efficacious. 7. Practico-practical judgment (intellect) of credentity: This must be believed by me here and now. 8. Supernatural choice (will) of the act of belief (pious affect of belief).

B. In The Order of Execution:

9. Command (intellect): “Believe.” 10. Active use (will) of the will (pious motion). 11. Act of faith (intellect): “I believe.” 12. Enjoyment (will) of the surety of faith.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CREDIBILITY AND CREDENTITY. Credibility is that which has the capacity of any truth to be believed in as much as it is inferred by its most certain signs and motives. Whenever one makes a judgment of credentity, the intellect and will declare that this truth must be believed with a divine faith now that its credibility has been established. This is important to know and retain in memory because apologetics that show faith is credible are by no means a sufficient principle to elicit the act of faith. Theologians think that judgment of credentity is found only in those who arrive at faith, and it per se requires some help of grace. Whilst, on the contrary, the judgment of credibility is found not only in those who arrive at faith but also in those who, with full awareness, sin in infidelity.

As said above, in the judgment of credibility, including the speculatively-practical judgment of credentity (act II, 5, b), it can be present even in those who knowingly sin in infidelity. The unbelievers can see that a doctrine is credible and that they are obliged to believe it under the pain of hell but still refuse to assent. See the case of the Pharisees who dissented out of malice and perversity; Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange puts it excellently ⁵⁷: “When the preaching of the Gospel, confirmed by miracles, is proposed to certain people like the Pharisees, they resist internal grace and do not sincerely intend salvation… they can, having seen such miracles, judge evidently concerning the credibility of the proposed preaching… they can know the obligation [I.e., credentity] of believing and nonetheless can refuse to believe on account of their perversity. Then the evidence of credibility and of the obligation to believe constitutes full awareness in this sin of infidelity.”

And to see how the complete knowledge of an obligation can be concomitant with a dissent of the act, the same Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange says he who knowingly commits injustice sees that justice must be kept by all and can say, “I see the better thing to do (speculative judgment), and I approve of it (speculatively-practical judgment), and yet I follow the worse path (practically-practical judgment and evil choice).”

However, in practically-practical judgment of credentity, there is a major difference. As said above it can only be found in people who actually came to faith, and it per se and essentially requires the help of grace. Men of good will, like the Holy Apostles, Zacchaeus, and Nicodemus, did not resist the actual grace coming to them preveniently to arouse them to the divine faith, and they sincerely desired their last end, which they “at least implicitly knew.” Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange says because of this, they did what was in their power and therefore did not only speculatively know credibility and the general obligation of believing but even arrived at a practically-practical judgment of credentity; namely, “This must be believed by me, here and now.” I see what is better, approve it, and indeed follow it.

BRIEF TREATMENT. As is clear, the act of faith is preceded by many acts. First, there are multiple operations where the mind examines the motives of credibility. Then, once it is established that the witnesses possess truthfulness and knowledge and that the witness has revealed a proposition to believe, the intellect then speculatively concludes that it is reasonable and rational to assent to his words and irrational to dissent.

However, this is not enough, because the act of faith is essentially obscure because of its object; this isn't sufficient to move the intellect; this therefore renders another judgment, a practical judgment. Or simply that the intellect is to be determined by the will. From this there is elicited an act of the will by which the intellect is efficaciously applied to assenting to the object of belief without any fear of error; and this assent is the very act of faith.

There are, therefore, three judgments to be distinguished: I) a speculative judgment by which it is said: I see that it is to be believed; II) a practical judgment by which it is said: The intellect is to be determined by the will; III) a judgment or assent by which the intellect says: I believe. And note that this judgment “I believe” is not the syllogistic conclusion of the first judgment (I see that it is to be believed), but something further is required: the intervention of the will. The main function of the will is to exclude all imprudent doubt.

Fr. Hugon⁵⁸ eloquently summarizes and shows the entire process of faith in this way: I do not, it is true, see that which I believe; yet I do not believe except after having seen that it is to be believed. I see that it is to be believed because I have found that the witness has spoken. I have found that the witness has spoken on account of such and such motives, which become known to me by induction or deduction. I can most rightly assert: I believe because I see that it is to be believed — provided that because designates a prior condition and not the sole formal reason of assent: for the formal motive is the authority of the one who reveals. Although, therefore, I believe because I see that it is to be believed, I properly believe on account of the authority of the one who reveals.

It is asked. Does one, to arrive at the certitude of miracles, require the grace of faith? ⁵⁹

I respond in the negative. Not only all Thomists, but likewise de Lugo, Scotus, Molina, Billot, Lahousse, Ripalda, Durandus, Mendive, and many others take the negative against Huby and Rousselot.

“From this interior and exterior point of view,” says Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange ⁶⁰, “The fact of revelation is considered, not as an essentially supernatural mystery, but as a miraculous intervention of God in the prophet's mind, itself confirmed by a sensible miracle… The end of the miracle, which is the evident credibility of the revealed truths, is therefore naturally knowable. Thus, the Church is visible by her marks, but the intimate life of the Church is a mystery accessible only to faith.”

Thus, there is a distinction between the actual sensible effect and the intimate and inner fecundity that is being expressed. You can see indeed that the Holy Roman Church bears the signs of unity, holiness, etc., with your intellect, but Her intimate life and its knowability are only accessible by the grace of faith. Take, for instance, the doubting Thomas, in whom seeing the Crucified God, with His scars, in His glorious body: Vidit hominem et cicatrices, et ex hoc credidit divinitatem resurgentis (“he saw the man and the scars, and from this he believed in the divinity of the risen one”)⁶¹. The marks remained unhidden, while the divinity was hidden. From those visible marks, the divinity was seen. So, the divine hymn of the Angelic Doctor: Adoro te devote, latens Deitas, quæ sub his figuris, vere latitas.

And if grace was necessary for the certitude of a miracle, consider the Pharisees, who resisted the divine grace; were they incapable of discerning the divine origin of the greatest miracles ever done? Absolutely not. Our Lord, on the contrary, says⁶², “If I had not done among them the works that no other has done, they would not have sin; but now they have seen, and they hate both me and my Father”. Or did the Pharisees express any doubt that the healing of the blind man in St. John 9 was of divine origin? The same must be asked: Where in Acts 4, after the Prince of the Apostles, St. Peter, heals a man, does the Sanhedrin admit there is a sign that they cannot deny because everyone in Jerusalem knows about it? Rightly so. Their deliberation, as we also see in John 9, makes it quite evident that they accepted the divine origin of the miracle, for in Acts 4 they do not dispute whether it happened; on the contrary, they affirm it; they only dispute how to contain its effects. See also the case in St. Matthew 12, where they perfidiously and insanely say that when our Lord performed an exorcism, it was from Beelzebub. Notice the language there: they do not deny the exorcism or its supernatural origin but rather try to explain it away with their fictions. The Lord Christ Jesus excellently refutes them: “Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate: and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand. And if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself: how then shall his kingdom stand?”

The Pharisees' reactions, therefore, prove the thesis: the natural certitude that a miracle has occurred (they indeed do not question this), and even that it obliges divine faith and that it is naturally attainable and was in reality attained by them. Hence, divine faith is not necessary to have the certitude of miracles.

DEDICATED TO THE CULT OF FATHER RÉGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS. AMDG.

Notes

1. Other works include for fundamental theology, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, C. 1-8; St. Robert Bellarmine, Controversies of the Christian Faith, see the first controversy there, along with his work On the Marks of the Church; Michaele Nicolau, S.J., Introduction to Theology, by the Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, also translated by Kenneth Baker S.J.; AD. Tanquerey, Manual of Dogmatic Theology, Tract I-II; Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, Book I, Parts I-II; along with a supplement from J. Wilhelm and T. B. Schannel, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol I; Fr. Charles Coppens, A Systematic Study of the Catholic Religion; Rev. W. Devivier S.J., Christian Apologetics; St. John Henry Card. Newman, Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles; Mons. G. Van Noorts very excellent dogmatic course, The True Religion; Fr. E. D0ronzos Science of Sacred Theology is quite an excellent introduction - see book 2; in Latin we have Fr. Mazzella S.J., De religione et Ecclesia praelectiones scholastico-dogmaticae; Card. Zigliara O.P., Propaedeutica ad Sacram Theologiam in usum scholarum seu Tractatus de ordine supernaturali; Fr. Christian Pesch S.J., Praelectiones dogmaticae; the edition I used for this is the 1924 edition. See tom. I, pt. I, sect. III; Masters Charles-René Billuart O.P. and Báñez O.P., commentary on ST. II-II. q. I and Holy Fr. Suárez S.J., De fide, disp. III; and the little Italian apologia of St. Alphonsus María Liguori titled Verità della Fede. For philosophical courses, I recommend: Fr. Hugon O.P., Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae; Fr. Felipe de la Santísima Trinidad O.C.D., Summa philosophiae; Fr. Urráburu S.J., Institutiones philosophicæ; Fr. John of St. Thomas O.P., Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus; Master Báñez O.P., Institutiones minoris Dialecticae; Fr. Goudin O.P., Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque D. Thomae dogmata; Miguel de la Trinidad O.C.D., Logica, in Collegium Complutense philosophicum; J. Gredt O.S.B., Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae; Conimbricensis of the Society, Aristotelis logicam. ↩

2. St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 2, c. 1. ↩

3. Fr. John of St. Thomas, Log. II P. Q. 21, Conimbricensis, Secunda pars, Cap. I, De Signis, Fr. Urráburu, Institutiones philosophicæ, C. I. Cf. The Angelic Doctor, 4. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. ↩

4. Introduction to Theology, pp. 149. ↩

5. Sent. II Dist., 13, q. I, ad. 9. ↩

6. Log, Q. 3, A. 4. See also Fr. J. Balmes, Filosofía Fundamental, bk. I, and his El Criterio. ↩

7. Ibid. ↩

8. For the other divisions, see the disputation Bk. I, Disp. I of Fr. Urráburu, Major Logic. And Fr. J. Balmes, Filosofía fundamental, bk. 1, c. 22, Card. Zigliara O.P., Criteriologia, bk. II, c. I, a. 1, H. Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, pp. 339, section 589; see also his arguments in section 590. ↩

9. Institutiones philosophicæ, Bk. I, c. II. ↩

10. Ibid., c. II, a. I. ↩

11. Divine Revelation, Vol 2, C. 19, Art. 3, §3. ↩

12. Ibid. ↩

13. Sess. III, C. 3. ↩

14. Can. 3.3. ↩

15. For the Scholastics' dissertations on this, consult: València, q. 1, de fide, punct. 4; Luis de Granada, in Symbolo Fidei; Gonet, disp. 1, de Fide; St. Bellarmine, bk. 4, de Ecclesia. ↩

16. Dei Filius. ↩

17. Metaphysics, bk. 1, c. 2. ↩

18. Divine Revelation, c. 18, a. 1, §3. ↩

19. See S. Th. I. q. 105; Monsabré, Introduction au dogme catholique, t. 2; and Card. Newman, Essays on Miracles. ↩

20. De potentia 6.1. ↩

21. S. Th, q. 110, a. 4. ↩

22. For Christ see St. Matthew 11:4, St. Mark 2:10, and an infinite number of other places; St. Peter in Acts 2:22-24; 3:14-16; St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:4-8; the entire gospel of St. Matthew shows throughout how Christ is a divine legate by appealing to His miracles and prophecy; likewise, Sts. Mark, Luke, and John; the early Christian Apologists who used not only miracles but other criterion: St. Justin in his Apologia uses fulfillment of prophecy as a criterion; Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis; St. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, book IV, who also uses fulfillment of prophecy; Tertullian, Apologeticum, here he speaks a lot about the internal motives; St. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata and Cohortatio ad Graecos; Minucius Felix, Octavius; Origen, Contra Celsum; Arnobius, Adversus nationes; Lactantius, Institutiones Divina; Eusebius of Caesarea, Demonstratio Evangelica; St. Augustine most eminently in De Civitate Dei, De Vera Religione, Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti, De utilitate credendi, and De fide rerum quae non videntur, in these works he uses the most superior criterion to prove Christianity, miracles; the later Catholics include St. Isidore of Spain and St. John Damascene against the uprising of Islam. After them we have St. Anselm, Proslogion, Monologion, Cur Deus Homo and many of his letters contain apologetic elements, see Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi; St. Thomas Aquinas, most especially his Summa Contra Gentiles written by the request of St. Raymond of Peñafort O.P., for conversion of Jews and Muslims in Spain; Ramon Martí O.P., Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Iudaeos; Ficino, De christiana religione; Savonarola in his Triumphus crucis seu de veritate fidei who proves the faith's divinity from the holiness of the Church. I also include for later apologetes Pascal, Les Pensées; Huet, Demonstratio evangelica; Bossuet, Discours sur l’histoire universelle christianae, see the second part there, in which he uses all of the criteria of St. Augustine that used in Civitate Dei; Concina O.P., Della religione rivelata contra gli ateisti, deisti, materialisti, indifferentisti; Chateaubriand, Le Génie du christianisme; Don. Balmes, El Protestantismo comparado con el Catolicismo en sus relaciones con la Civilización Europea; and Don. Donoso Cortés, Ensayo Sobre el Catolicismo, el Liberalismo, y el Socialismo Considerados en sus Principios Fundamentales. For a more exhaustive list, see Sacrae Theologiae Summa, Introduction to theology; Emmanuel Doronzo, Science of Sacred Theology; Maisonneuve, Apologétique; Dieckmann, De revelatione; see also Turmel, Histoire de la théologie positive depuis l'origine jusqu'au concile de Trente; Dictionnaire apologétique, art. “Apologétique, apologie,” vol. I, col. 191-198. ↩

23. Dei filius. ↩

24. See St. Thomas, the indirect argument ex signo, ST. I, q. 55, a. 5; a very certain argument, id., ibid., q. 43, a. 1; SCG., l. 3, c. 155; Quodl., 2, a. 6, ad 1; cf. See also his lecture on St. John, c. 9, lect. 3, n. 8; 3 Sent., dist. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2; dist. 24, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 4; dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 4. ↩

25. See all the references above along with St. Albert the Great in II Sent., dist. IX, a. 4; and where it confirms faith, dist. XVIII, a. 2, ad obj. 4. ↩

26. ST. III, q. 43, a. 1. ↩

27. Quodl. II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4. ↩

28. Divine Revelation, C. 19, a. 4, §3. ↩

29. loc. cit. ↩

30. ST. I. q. 105, a. 8. ↩

31. For all of this plus more, I highly urge you to read Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, Divine Revelation, C. 6, A. 1, §2. ↩

32. Fr. John of St. Thomas in his Cursus theologicus, De gratia, disp. 20, a. 1, solv. arg, no. 4, says: It must be noted that supernaturality can belong to a thing from the perspective of three principles, namely from the efficient cause, the final cause, and the formal cause. It cannot belong to it from the perspective of material causality, given that the material cause is the very subject in which such supernatural forms are received, and this is the soul itself or one of its powers, which are natural beings, even though they receive on account of an obediential potency. From the perspective of the efficient cause, something is called supernatural when it is done supernaturally, whether the thing thus done is supernatural or natural, just as the resurrection of a dead person or the illumination of a blind person are modally supernatural, though the thing done is natural, namely the life of a man or the power of sight. From the perspective of the final cause, something is called supernatural when it is extrinsically [ab extrinsico] ordered to a supernatural end. For example, if an act of temperance (or some other acquired virtue) is ordered by charity toward the merit of eternal life, it receives in itself a supernatural mode of ordering toward such an end. And in this way, the humanity of Christ has a supernatural mode of union to the Word to which it is ordered as toward an end and a terminus of union. From the perspective of formal causality, something is called supernatural when from this formal, specificative ratione it is oriented to [respicit] a supernatural object. And this alone is called essential supernaturality, which is so about the act’s species and nature, which is taken from the formal object. ↩

33. SCG, Bk. 3, c. 100. ↩

34. On this, I recommend the Angelic Doctors' lectures in the Metaphysics, V., lect. 14; In IX., lect. 1., Fr. John of St. Thomas, Cursus philosophicus, Physica, q. 4, a. 2, Fr. Hugon O.P., Commentarii secundum mentem D. Angelici de XXIV Thesibus Thomisticis, Th. I, ↩

35. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange says some, like Eusebius in Dem. Ev., bk. 5, prol and St. Thomas in ST. II-II, q. 171, a. 1, think it is from προ-φαίνω. ↩

36. Exodus 4:14-16; 7:1. ↩

37. Divine Revelation, c. 20, a. 4, §4. ↩

38. ST. II-II, q. 171, a. 2. ↩

39. ST. II, q. 171, a. 2, “Now, the prophetic light does not exist in the prophet’s intellect as an abiding form, for otherwise a prophet would always be able to prophesy at will, which clearly is not the case” ↩

40. Summa Summae S. Thomae, t. III, dist. II, a. I. ↩

41. See the above reference. ↩

42. Cf. Lagrange, “Pascal et les prophéties messianiques,” in the Revue biblique, 1906, p. 540. In the Old Testament, one has sought to find an example of it in Daniel's seventy weeks. In the New Testament, one may cite the prophecies of Christ relating to his return to Jerusalem, to the sufferings he was to endure there, to his resurrection on the third day. Matthew 16:21; 17:22; 20:19. Or again the prediction of Peter's triple denial, on the very night of Jesus's arrest, before the cock crowed. Matthew 26:34. ↩

43. See the cases of Isaiah 7:14, and of Matthew 24:1-36. ↩

44. This is the case of the simple prophetic instinct, of which St. Thomas speaks, II-II, q. 171, a. 5; q. 173, a. 4, whose predictions can sometimes be uncertain or false. ↩

45. II-II, q. 173, a. 2 — can modify the outcome of the threat and obtain mercy for us in place of punishment. Q. 171, a. 6, ad 2; q. 174, a. 1; De veritate, q. 12, a. 10 c., and ad 7, 8, 9, 10, 13; a. 11, ad 13 sq.; In Jeremiah, c. 18; In Isaiah, c. 34; In Matthew., c. i. Thus, although the predicted effect does not come to pass, the prophecy is not false, for it indicates what would happen if the disposition of causes to effects were not modified by our free intervention, subsequent to the prophecy. Ibid., q. 171, a. 6, ad 2; De veritate, q. 12, a. 11, ad 2; SCG, l. III, c. 155. A prophecy made with an oath, cf. Psalm 109:4, is always absolute. Examples of comminatory (threatening) prophecies: Jon. 3:4; Isa. 38:2. ↩

46. cf. Isa. 6:1 sq.; Ezek. 1:3 sq.; Amos 7:7 sq., or in symbolic visions. Ezek. 2:9 sq.; 37:1 sq.; 40-46. It involves multiple degrees and aspects: prophetic light is more vivid in the waking state than if it borrows the medium of a dream in order to be communicated; words directly perceived are more expressive than mere signs, symbols of the prophesied reality; the more expressive the signs, the higher the prophecy; and if the prophet not only hears but sees the one who speaks to him, the degree of the prophecy will be more perfect: at the supreme rank, if he sees in the one who speaks to him a representation of God himself, as once did Isaiah, 6:1; less perfect, if an angel appears; still less perfect, if the interlocutor is only a man. ↩

47. Thus Abraham saw three angels, Gen. 18:2; Moses, the burning bush, Exod. 3:2; Daniel, the mysterious characters, Dan. 5:25; cf. 8:15. Cf. St. Thomas, q. 173, a. 3. ↩

48. Cf. q. 174, a. 1, 2, 3. There is in the sacred books only one example of a revelation made by dream to the prophet himself. Dan. 7:1. ↩

49. Dei filius. ↩

50. De divinis nominibus, c. I, lect. I. ↩

51. Disp. IV, c. II, a. I. ↩

52. Dei filius, ch. 3. ↩

53. S. Th, II-II, q. I. The Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus, tract. XVII, De Fide. Also see Mons. G. Van Noort, The Sources of Revelation, Divine Faith. ↩

54. See Card. Billot, De Virtutibus, Th. XVIII. ↩

55. Traité de l’amour de Dieu, bk. 2, c. 14. ↩

56. Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet explains it well in his Manuale Thomistarum, Treatise VIII, C. II, § 7, 29. ↩

57. Divine Revelation, c. 15, a. 3, §2. ↩

58. Log, q. 3, a. 6, schol. II. ↩

59. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange treats this in La grâce de la foi et le miracle, in Revue thomiste, 1918, p. 305. ↩

60. loc. cit., note 1. ↩

61. The Angelic Doctor, in St. John, c. 20, lect. 6, 2564. ↩

62. St. John 15:24. ↩