Against Caesaropapism Part 1

Preface

The research underlying this series was prepared before my August 22 debate with Latter-Day Lion. I have since revised the material for publication. The topic of the debate was "According to the historical record, only an Emperor can call/convene/ratify an ecumenical council, with or without the bishop of Rome." This prompt may be confusing to those of y'all who know the religion my opponent adheres to (Mormonism), and this is a topic I will briefly address at the end of this series.

I began with a read over the history of all 21 of the councils utilizing Fr Clement Raab's summary on the 20 councils. Following Raab, I read St Robert Bellarmine's On the Councils, and Fr Domenico Palmieri's work on the Roman Pontiff. Additional to that, I read numerous epistles of the Fathers and sections out of many works on the interactions between Roman Pontiffs and Emperors, and the commentaries from the Scholastics on the history of the Church.

The argument I am presenting is my own and is synthesized from my reading of the scholastics and the history. I do not intend to put forward the view of any single theologian, though St Robert Bellarmine would be the largest inspiration for the argument. I have also laid it out in the manner of the scholastics, beginning with the state of the question and the objection, then the distinctions, my thesis and its proof, and finally the replies to the objection.

The State of the Question

The topic of the debate puts several claims together into one, and I will need to separate them before I can answer them. It claims that only an Emperor can call, convene, or ratify an ecumenical council, and that he can do so with or without the bishop of Rome, and from this my opponent concludes that an Emperor is an absolute necessity for an ecumenical council to take place. To call and to convene a council both have to do with its convocation, while to ratify has to do with its ratification, and the last clause has to do with where the Roman Pontiff stands in both.

I can concede from the start that across the first 7 ecumenical councils, imperial authority did in fact supply summons, logistics, civil promulgation, and civil enforcement, and I will even concede that the Emperors at times went further than this, as when their officials chaired the sessions of a council and set before the bishops the business they were to decide, or when the Emperor came to address the council in person. I can concede as well that material convocation of a council was at one point the responsibility and duty of the Christian emperors. This, however, was primarily due to the fact that only the emperor had the means by which to supply the material needs to gather all the bishops of the Christian world, both monetarily and politically, and secondarily the laws of the land demanding an emperor consent to large gatherings. But I deny that any of these acts made a council ecumenical, and we see in the history that these acts are kept distinct from the ecclesiastical ratification of a council, which pertains to the bishops of the Church alone, and principally to the Roman Pontiff.

In this first part I will treat the first 7 councils only through the distinctions below, and I will leave the history of each particular council to the parts that follow, where I will also take up the claim that the Roman Pontiff is necessary for the ecumenicity of a council. In these distinctions below I only aim to show forth the way by which we can determine that an Emperor is insufficient to constitute the ecumenicity of a council, and that he is not an absolute necessity for its convocation.

The Objection

According to the historical record, only an Emperor can call/convene/ratify an ecumenical council, with or without the bishop of Rome, and thus an Emperor is an absolute necessity for an ecumenical council to take place.

I will state the objection as strongly as I can:

The Emperors summoned the councils. Eusebius records that Constantine "convoked a general council" at Nicaea, and Constantine writes of the synod at Arles that "we have commanded a number of bishops from a great many different places to assemble." Even the Second Council of Nicaea says that it met "by decree of our pious and Christ-loving emperors Constantine and Eirene his mother." Therefore it is the Emperor who calls and convenes a council.
The Emperors made the decrees of the councils imperial law and enforced them, as Justinian did for the first four councils in his Code, and so it is the Emperor who ratifies a council.
Without the consent of the Emperor, his public vehicles, his roads, and his treasury, the bishops could not gather at all. Therefore an Emperor is necessary for a council to take place.
The Fathers who deny the Emperor any authority in these matters, as St Athanasius does, are merely overstating, since the Emperor did in fact convene councils.

The Necessary Distinctions

These distinctions provided are not exhaustive, and other factors play into the distinct actions we see take place for an ecumenical council to be truly ecumenical. The distinctions I have selected here are selected specifically because the whole proposition depends upon them.

The proposition takes the words call, convene, and ratify as if each could only mean one thing, when each of them can in fact be said in two senses. My argument will revolve around four categories I have named, "Material Convocation" and "Ecclesial Convocation" for the calling and convening of a council, and "Civil Enforcement" and "Ecclesiastical Ratification" for its ratification. These categories are not alien to the schoolmen. While many of them use different names, the ideas expressed in their words bear on the naming I have chosen, as when Fr Palmieri speaks of a ministerial and a coercive convocation, or when Cardinal Billot speaks of the material act and the act of power. Finally, as we will see, these categories existed virtually in the minds of the Fathers, and while they do not invoke them by the names provided by me or the scholastics, they can be extracted from the words of the Fathers themselves.

Firstly: Material Convocation and Ecclesial Convocation

Material Convocation, also called "ministerial convocation" by Fr Domenico Palmieri¹, is the arranging and ordering of the meeting: summons, venue, transport, order, funding, etc. These arrangements are supplied by those with the means to provide them. This sort of convocation is subservient to the Church, and is generally done by Emperors at the command or request of the Church. Palmieri makes clear that this ministerial activity is subordinate to ecclesiastical authority, even though the Emperor need not always wait for the Church to ask before he acts.

Distinct from material convocation is what Palmieri calls "coercive convocation, or simply convocation by authority"², and what I have deemed Ecclesial Convocation, which obliges the bishops as an ecclesial body, and not by a civil command, and so makes the council a legitimate ecclesial assembly.

Here you will first note that convocation can be understood either for the material act whose effect is the mere fact of the gathering of bishops, or for the act of power by which the gathering is conferred the character and existence of a legitimate synod.

— Cardinal Billot, A Dogmatic Manual of Theology, vol. IX, Question XVI "On Councils," §1 (Latin: Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi, 1909, p. 699)

Cardinal Billot explains this distinction in simple words, as convocation in the first sense he describes is what I have deemed Material Convocation, the act whose effect is the gathering of bishops, and in the second sense it is the "act of power" of jurisdiction over those who are convened, which is Ecclesial Convocation.

Secondly: Civil Enforcement and Ecclesiastical Ratification

Civil Enforcement, also called civil promulgation, is making the council's decisions imperial law and enforcing them civilly. Once again, this is fulfilled by an authority that has the civil means to achieve such enforcement.

Distinct from civil enforcement is Ecclesiastical Ratification, also called canonical judgement, which is the Church's own judgement upon the matter, recognizing the teachings of a council as binding upon the Universal Church. Oftentimes civil enforcement is confused for ecclesiastical ratification, as they often come hand in hand. This, however, is a grave confusion, as it takes the things of God and makes them things of men. Civil enforcement depends upon an ecclesial judgement already given, whether dogmatic or merely disciplinary, and so it stands after that judgement in authority, even in the cases where an imperial edict happened to come first in time.

Furthermore, it must be noted that it is the duty of Christian emperors to use their power in defense of the Church, and that great benefit accrues to ecclesiastical authority when rulers spontaneously—as they ought—lend their efforts in aid of the Church; hence, in its proper modesty, ecclesiastical authority, when it sees them acting rightly, allows them from time to time to carry out without its prior admonition whatever conduces to the good of the Church; for such execution, both by its own nature and by the intention of those acting, is understood to be subordinated to ecclesiastical power, and such permission is a sign of the authority's consent, by virtue of which all things are done.

— Fr Domenico Palmieri S.J., On the Roman Pontiff, Thesis XXVIII (Latin: Tractatus de Romano Pontifice, 1891, pp. 673–674)

My Thesis

Across the first 7 ecumenical councils, the Emperors at times did a great deal more than gather the bishops, but by right their calling and convening of a council could only ever be a material convocation, and their ratifying of it could only ever be a civil enforcement. The ecclesial convocation and the ecclesiastical ratification of these councils pertain to the bishops of the Church alone, and principally to the Roman Pontiff. Thus an Emperor is insufficient to make a council ecumenical, and though he was on many occasions materially necessary, he was never an absolute necessity.

The Proof of the Thesis

Firstly, as to Convocation

In this section I intend to show from many sources that the Emperors convened the councils in the first sense, by gathering the bishops and providing for them, and that the second sense belonged to the Church.

Eusebius records actions that illustrate this first sense of convocation.

Then as if to bring a divine array against this enemy, he convoked a general council, and invited the speedy attendance of bishops from all quarters, in letters expressive of the honorable estimation in which he held them. Nor was this merely the issuing of a bare command but the emperor's good will contributed much to its being carried into effect: for he allowed some the use of the public means of conveyance, while he afforded to others an ample supply of horses for their transport. The place, too, selected for the synod, the city Nicæa in Bithynia (named from Victory), was appropriate to the occasion. As soon then as the imperial injunction was generally made known, all with the utmost willingness hastened there, as though they would outstrip one another in a race; for they were impelled by the anticipation of a happy result to the conference, by the hope of enjoying present peace, and the desire of beholding something new and strange in the person of so admirable an emperor.

— Eusebius of Caesarea, Life of Constantine, Book III, Chapter VI (NPNF translation)

Eusebius here is articulating beautifully the sense in which Emperor Constantine was seen as convening the Nicene council. Constantine generously provided the means for transport, the location for the synod, the invitation, etc., and these are concrete examples of what Billot calls the material act of gathering bishops.

For the maintenance of all ample provision was daily furnished by the emperor's command.

— Eusebius of Caesarea, Life of Constantine, Book III, Chapter IX (NPNF translation)

Since, therefore, we have commanded a number of bishops from a great many different places to assemble in the city of Arles, before the kalends of August, we have thought proper to write to thee also that thou shouldst secure from the most illustrious Latronianus, corrector of Sicily, a public vehicle, and that thou shouldst take with thee two others of the second rank whom thou thyself shalt choose, together with three servants who may serve you on the way, and betake thyself to the above-mentioned place before the appointed day; that by thy firmness, and by the wise unanimity and harmony of the others present, this dispute, which has disgracefully continued until the present time, in consequence of certain shameful strifes, after all has been heard which those have to say who are now at variance with one another, and whom we have likewise commanded to be present, may be settled in accordance with the proper faith, and that brotherly harmony, though it be but gradually, may be restored.

— Constantine, in Eusebius of Caesarea, Church History, Book X, Chapter V, para. 23 (NPNF translation)

Constantine's letter concerning Arles, a regional council of the West, likewise documents an imperial summons and the provision of public transport. It also tells us why he summoned them, which was so that by "the wise unanimity and harmony of the others present" the dispute "may be settled in accordance with the proper faith," and this gives us a view into how the Emperor views his own authority regarding these things, as he gives the summons but leaves the settling of the dispute to the bishops.

Since it was necessary to take due care for the calm and good order proper to the deliberations of your most holy council, we have not neglected to ensure that it will be free of disturbance from any quarter; we are convinced that your religiousness needs no help from outside to bestow peace even on others, but this is something that in our attentive concern for piety we could not overlook. Therefore Candidianus, the most magnificent count of the hallowed domestici, has been instructed to make his way to your most holy council, but to take no part in the investigation and clarification to be made about the most pious doctrines, for it is unlawful for a person who is not on the list of most sacred bishops to take part in church business.

— Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III to the Council, in Richard Price and Thomas Graumann, The Council of Ephesus of 431, p. 215

Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III make clear that they have sent Candidianus for the purpose that "due care for the calm and good order" may be achieved at the council. It is also interesting that the pious emperors declare it unlawful for anyone not on the list of most sacred bishops "to take part in church business," and so Candidianus is sent to keep order, but he is kept out of the investigation and clarification of doctrine, and in this the emperors make distinct the role of their official from the authority of the bishops in doctrinal matters.

We see the ecclesial convocation at work in these same councils as well. While the council that would meet at Chalcedon was being prepared, the Empress Pulcheria, wife of the Emperor Marcian, wrote to Pope St Leo:

Accordingly, may your reverence deign to indicate, in whatever way you may decide, that all the bishops of the entire east, Thrace and Illyricum, according to the pleasure also of our lord the most pious emperor my consort, should speedily assemble from the eastern parts in one city and, when a council has been held there, issue on your authority, according to the dictates of faith and Christian piety, decrees relating to the catholic confession and to those bishops who were previously excluded.

— Empress Pulcheria to Pope St Leo the Great, Letter 77 (22 November 450), in Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, vol. I, p. 94

Notice, the Empress does not simply order the bishops to gather, but asks Pope St Leo to indicate "in whatever way you may decide" that they should gather, and she asks that the council, once it is held, issue its decrees "on your authority." The pleasure of the Emperor is what brings the bishops together in one city, but it is on the authority of the Pope that the council is to decree, and so we see in the words of the Empress the distinction between the material convocation of the Emperor and the ecclesial convocation of the Pope. After the council was finished, Pope St Leo wrote to the bishops who had attended it, and he names both of these acts side by side when he speaks of how the council was summoned.

Therefore, lest through malign interpretation it might appear uncertain whether I approve what was decreed about the faith at the council of Chalcedon through your unanimity, I have sent this letter to all our brethren and fellow bishops who attended the aforesaid council – a letter which the most glorious and clement prince, as I have requested, will out of love for the catholic faith deign to bring to your notice, so that both the whole brotherhood and the hearts of all the faithful may know that I, not only through the brethren who represented me but also through approving the conciliar proceedings, have joined my own judgement to yours, in the case evidently of the faith alone (which needs to be constantly repeated) for the sake of which it was decided by decree of the Christian emperors and the consent of the apostolic see to summon a general council, so that through the condemnation of the heretics who refused to be corrected, no doubt at all should remain about the true incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

— Pope St Leo the Great to the Council of Chalcedon, Letter 114 (21 March 453), in Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, vol. III, p. 153

Pope St Leo is very clear here, as he says that the general council was summoned "by decree of the Christian emperors and the consent of the apostolic see," and so the summoning of the council required both, the decree of the Emperors to gather the bishops, and the consent of the Apostolic See for that gathering to be a general council of the Church. It is also interesting that Leo asks the Emperor to bring his letter to the notice of the bishops, as the Emperor once again serves the Church with his means, while the approval of what the council decreed about the faith belongs to Leo, as he says that he has "joined my own judgement to yours," which we will see more of in the second part of the thesis.

Secondly, as to Ratification

For the second part of the thesis there is a great deal of evidence from the Popes, the Fathers, and the councils of the era of the first 7 councils, and I will highlight a few that I find to be most ancient and clear.

Pope St Leo clearly explicates this view of Palmieri long before Palmieri, in his letter to Emperor Leo I, where he makes distinct the action of the Emperor, i.e., to defend the decrees of the Church by suppressing those who go against them, and to restore peace to places disturbed by heretics.

Since the Lord has endowed your Clemency with so much insight into His mysteries, you should readily recognize that royal power was conferred on you not only for the rule of the world, but particularly for the protection of the Church, so that by suppressing the nefarious ventures you may defend the good decrees that have been made and restore true peace to places that have been disturbed.

— Pope St Leo the Great to Emperor Leo I, Letter 156, trans. Edmund Hunt, Letters, Fathers of the Church 34, p. 244

The Emperor did not make these decrees, but is only to defend "the good decrees that have been made," and thus, we see Pope St Leo make the distinction between civil enforcement and the ecclesiastical ratification it serves.

Cease these proceedings, I beseech you, and remember that you are a mortal man. Be afraid of the day of judgment, and keep yourself pure thereunto. Intrude not yourself into Ecclesiastical matters, neither give commands unto us concerning them; but learn them from us. God has put into your hands the kingdom; to us He has entrusted the affairs of His Church; and as he who would steal the empire from you would resist the ordinance of God, so likewise fear on your part lest by taking upon yourself the government of the Church, you become guilty of a great offense.

— St Athanasius, History of the Arians 44 (recording Hosius of Cordoba's letter to Constantius II)

In this work of Athanasius, he records Hosius of Cordoba's response to Constantius II attempting to usurp the authority of the Church to force bishops to condemn Athanasius and acquiesce in the demands of the Arian party. We find this same thought of an Emperor having no true ecclesial authority in other bishops of the time as well, especially in the following citations.

When have you heard, most gracious Emperor, that laymen gave judgment concerning a bishop in a matter of faith? Are we so prostrate through the flattery of some as to be unmindful of the rights of the priesthood, and do I think that I can entrust to others what God has given me? If a bishop is to be taught by a layman, what will follow? Let the layman argue, and the bishop listen, let the bishop learn of the layman. But undoubtedly, whether we go through the series of the holy Scriptures, or the times of old, who is there who can deny that, in a matter of faith,—in a matter I say of faith,—bishops are wont to judge of Christian emperors, not emperors of bishops.

— St Ambrose, Epistle 21 to Valentinian II, §4

Ambrose is clear in his thought, as he asks a rhetorical question of the Emperor, "when have you heard, most gracious Emperor," suggesting that this action of the emperor is novel and unheard of, and then he clarifies what the rhetorical question pertains to, which is the judging of a bishop in a matter of faith. Ambrose then states the conclusion directly when he says that in a matter of faith it is bishops who judge emperors, and not emperors who judge bishops.

Tribute is due to Cæsar, we do not deny it. The Church belongs to God, therefore it ought not to be assigned to Cæsar. For the temple of God cannot be Cæsar’s by right. That this is said with respectful feeling for the Emperor, no one can deny. For what is more full of respect than that the Emperor should be called the son of the Church. As it is said, it is said without sin, since it is said with the divine favour. For the Emperor is within the Church, not above it. For a good emperor seeks the aid of the Church and does not refuse it.

— St Ambrose, Sermon against Auxentius 36–37

Ambrose indirectly contextualizes his letter to Valentinian when he is writing against Auxentius, and he is clear that tribute is due to Caesar, and that the state is the emperor's realm, but he is just as clear that the Church belongs to God and so cannot be assigned to Caesar, and that the Emperor is within the Church and not above it.

For if a judgment had been passed by Bishops, what concern had the Emperor with it? Or if it was only a threat of the Emperor, what need in that case was there of the so-named Bishops? When was such a thing heard of before from the beginning of the world? When did a judgment of the Church receive its validity from the Emperor? Or rather when was his decree ever recognised by the Church? There have been many Councils held heretofore; and many judgments passed by the Church; but the Fathers never sought the consent of the Emperor thereto, nor did the Emperor busy himself with the affairs of the Church.

— St Athanasius, History of the Arians 52 (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 4)

St Athanasius could not be clearer with his words, as he teaches that a judgement of the Church does not receive its validity from the Emperor, and that the Church does not concede to the doctrinal whims of an Emperor.

And how can a council be ‘great and ecumenical’ when it received neither recognition nor assent from the primates of the other churches, but they consigned it to anathema? It did not enjoy the cooperation of the then pope of Rome or his priests, neither by means of his representatives or an encyclical letter, as is the rule for councils; nor did it win the assent of the patriarchs of the east, of Alexandria, Antioch and the holy city, or of their priests and bishops.

— The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, Session VI, trans. Richard Price, vol. II, p. 442

The view of the first 7 councils on how a council must be considered ecumenical culminates in Nicaea II. Following the heretical "council" of Hiereia summoned by the iconoclastic Constantine V, the Church needed to, in no clearer words, dismiss this notion that a council's ecumenicity rests on the imperial power. Notice, the council names the cooperation of the pope of Rome, through his representatives or an encyclical letter, as "the rule for councils," together with the assent of the patriarchs of the east. Hiereia had an Emperor behind it, and yet the council makes no mention of the Emperor as sufficient for the ecumenicity of a council.

Replies to the Objection

To the first. I grant that the Emperors summoned the councils, but I deny that their summons made them councils. The Emperors convoked by material convocation, summoning the bishops and providing for their transport and upkeep, as Eusebius and Constantine record, but ecclesial convocation is another act, as we see in the letters of the Empress Pulcheria and of Pope St Leo, where the bishops are gathered by the pleasure of the Emperor but are to decree on the authority of the Pope, and where the council is summoned "by decree of the Christian emperors and the consent of the apostolic see." The Second Council of Nicaea shows this well, as the council says it met "by decree of our pious and Christ-loving emperors Constantine and Eirene his mother," and yet it judged that Hiereia, which also had an Emperor behind it, was no ecumenical council at all, because it lacked the cooperation of Rome and the assent of the patriarchs, and so if an imperial decree were enough to make a council, Hiereia would have been one.

To the second. That the Emperors ratified the councils, I grant, if we speak of civil enforcement, but I deny that they ever ratified them ecclesiastically. In his correspondence with Pope John II, preserved in the Code, Justinian recognizes four councils that preceded this legislation, and he presents his profession as agreeing with what the Apostolic See teaches and proclaims.

Moreover, we recognize four sacred councils, that is to say, the one composed of three hundred and eighteen Holy Fathers who assembled in the City of Nicea; and that of the hundred and fifty Holy Fathers who met in this Imperial City; and that of the Holy Fathers who first congregated at Ephesus; and that of the Holy Fathers who met at Chalcedony, as your Apostolic See teaches and proclaims.

— Justinian to Pope John II, in S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, vol. XII, originally in Codex Iustinianus I.1.8

By the time of this exchange, these councils had been dogmatically binding for about eighty years in the case of Chalcedon (451), and for two centuries in the case of Nicaea (325). In the same letter, Justinian even says that nothing which has reference to the state of the Church is to be discussed without being brought to the notice of the Pope, "because you are the head of all the Holy Churches."

We see Fr Gonet directly comment on the Code of Justinian, showing why Christian Emperors enacted laws concerning faith and Ecclesiastical matters.

Finally, the constitutions of Justinian and other Emperors concerning faith and Ecclesiastical matters are not new enactments, but promulgations of Canons already issued by the Church, so that secular Judges, and others subject to their power, might understand what was to be held and executed in regard to those Canons, and might know that it was the Emperors' will that they be exactly observed by all.

— Fr Jean-Baptiste Gonet, On the Supreme Pontiff, Article 1, §II

Gonet's reasoning for why imperial law restated and enforced teachings already authoritative in the Church is "that they be exactly observed by all," which is downstream from but similar to the reasoning given by Fr Palmieri. Cardinal Billot gives even more context to this:

As for princes, there cannot even be a question, since it is more than sufficiently well known that they by no means belong to the hierarchical order. Hence, as Bellarmine says in Book 1, De conciliis, chapter 17, they were formerly invited both to defend the council and to serve as witnesses and parties cognizant of conciliar decrees, that they might afterwards suppress transgressors and the contumacious by their own power.

— Cardinal Billot, A Dogmatic Manual of Theology, vol. IX, Question XVI "On Councils," §2 (Latin: Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi, 1909, p. 701)

To the third. That the Emperor was therefore necessary, I distinguish. That the bishops in those times could not gather without the Emperor, both because they lacked the means and because the law of the empire required his consent, I grant, and in this sense he was necessary physically and by the civil law. But that he was necessary juridically, by which I mean ecclesially, as though the Church could not gather her bishops without him, I deny. Shortly before Nicaea, imperial policy could still directly obstruct episcopal gatherings, as Eusebius records that Licinius prohibited bishops from meeting in synods³, and in the centuries before the legalization of Christianity in the empire, the churches were only materially capable of regional gatherings, since larger gatherings could not be held without great suspicion from the princes of the state. Fr Domenico Palmieri points this out clearly.

Again, it must be noted that when a matter can be peacefully handled with the civil power, every consideration counsels that it be done; and at that period the law of the empire forbade public assemblies of men without the consent of the emperor, so that, in order that emperors might not be aggrieved at having their law flouted, their consent had to be sought. Finally, at that period the public vehicles of travel through the regions of the empire were not available to all, but were under the power of the emperor and required his permission for their use; and the not inconsiderable expenses of the journey for so many bishops coming from the most distant places, and the necessary costs of maintaining them while the council was in session, could be supplied only from the imperial treasury. It was therefore physically impossible for bishops to celebrate an ecumenical council without the consent of the emperor, even though they could have done so juridically of themselves.

— Fr Domenico Palmieri S.J., On the Roman Pontiff, Thesis XXVIII (Latin: Tractatus de Romano Pontifice, 1891, p. 674)

This is not to say, as I have already demonstrated, that an Emperor was not at some times necessary for a council, but this is to be understood only as a necessity due to a lack of means on the side of the Church, and to the laws of the empire, and not as an absolute necessity or some divine prerogative.

To the fourth. Some may suggest that St Athanasius is merely overstating, or that he is simply wrong. "Constantine convened Nicaea, and they had to ask for his consent!" some may say, but St Athanasius, in the same work, reproduces the letter of Hosius reminding Constantius that at the Council of Sardica "you and your brother Constans of blessed memory assembled us all together" (History of the Arians 44). Thus, Athanasius does truly know that an Emperor assembles a council, but he clearly makes the distinction that this is in fact merely a material convocation, as he teaches that an emperor has no competence to give an ecclesiastical judgement its validity.

Conclusion

So, to return to the topic of the debate, an Emperor did call and convene the councils, and an Emperor did ratify them, and at times the Emperors did even more than this, but by right their acts could only be material and civil in the senses I have distinguished above. The ecclesial convocation and the ecclesiastical ratification of the councils belonged to the bishops, and principally to the Roman Pontiff, as Nicaea II teaches against Hiereia. Thus, we can say that an Emperor is insufficient to make a council ecumenical, but that on many occasions, he was materially necessary. In the parts that follow, I will apply these distinctions to each of the councils.

Agnus Dei Miserere Nobis

Notes

"The second act of convocation is an act of ministry performed in service to the power of jurisdiction, or it is an act of counsel or exhortation, inviting bishops to come together in council." Fr Domenico Palmieri S.J., On the Roman Pontiff, Thesis XXVIII (Latin: Tractatus de Romano Pontifice, 1891, p. 671). ↩
"A twofold act of convocation must be distinguished. The first is an act of jurisdiction over those who are convened, which act therefore obliges them to come; this can be called coercive convocation, or simply convocation by authority." Fr Domenico Palmieri S.J., On the Roman Pontiff, Thesis XXVIII (Latin: Tractatus de Romano Pontifice, 1891, p. 671). ↩
"Not finding any fault, however, or any way of charging those men, he issued a law decreeing that the bishops should never communicate actively with each other at all, that none of them be permitted to visit his neighbour’s church, and that no synods, councils, or discussions of common interest be held. That was just a pretext for ill-treating us: one either had to defy the law and be liable to punishment, or submit to the decree and break the Church’s canons. There was no other way of resolving important issues except by synodical meetings; divine canons prescribe that episcopal ordinations may only take place in this way." Eusebius, Life of Constantine I.51.1–2, trans. Averil Cameron and Stuart G. Hall, p. 90 ↩